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Introduction
"The scale of reason after all is not quite impartial, and
one of its arms, bearing the inscription, "Hope of the
Future," has an advantage of construction, causing even those
slight reasons which fall into its scale to outweigh the
speculations of greater weight on the other side. This is
the only inaccuracy which I cannot easily remove, and which,
in fact, I never want to remove . " (Kant, 15)
I have observed that in every theory of art, except
possibly Plato' s is a mysterious undef inable element . Some
theories attempt to explain it, while others deny its
existence. Danto calls it a new predicate to the "is. of
artistxc identification," which means something akin to a
new meaning. Clive Bell calls it significant form, or "a
combination of lines and colours .. .that moves me
aesthetically,
"^ and says outright that art's "kingdom is not
of this world."
Tolstoy terms this undefinable element the
"infectiousness of art." The viewer feels "as if what it
expresses were just what he had been wishing to
express.""
John Gardner speaks of this feeling also, saying that we
respond to a work of art "with instant recognition and
admiration, saying, 'Yes, you're right, that's how it is.'"7
R.G. Collingwood finds this same element in the ability of
art to prophesy or intuit the
viewers' own "secrets of their
own
hearts,"
and act as a healer, providing the "medicine
for the worst disease of mind, the corruption of
11
consciousness .
"
Nietzsche likewise describes the transformation of "the
horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one
i n
can live,"iU that is, joy in the struggle of existence. Art
justifies the existence of the world. Nietzsche's idea of
art as redeemer is like Ernest Becker' s idea of art as
creation of meaning in a neutral world.
Stanley Cavell alludes to art' s independence as an
entity separate from the observer when he points out that its
sincerity may cause it to "become uninfectious and even (and
even deliberately) unappetizing in order to remain art at
all."11
Richard Wollheim speaks of tension between loss and
achievement and a language of signs that requires ever
deepening attention to interpret. Suzanne Langer's
mysterious element is that the artwork is a symbol for "the
articulation of feeling. "-^ The artwork "is semblance, but
seems to be charged with reality." 3 The issue of the
reality of an artwork is prevalent in aesthetic theory. Ted
Cohen finds it unnecessary to decide always whether a
particular work is or isn't art.
George Dickie, whose cynical definition is that art is
anything that anyone presents as art, claims that almost
anything can be art. However, he speaks of the "moral
vision"
of art being inseparable from it. 4 He also
Ill
discusses originality: "A copy of an original painting is not
a work of art because originality of the kind the copy lacks
is required of a work of art."1^ This circular requirement
endows the quality of originality with recognizability .
Monroe Beardsley gives artistic intention the same ability to
be discerned in the work. "The narrative is in fact
dramatically shaped, the characters are three-dimensional and
live. The style carries heavy overtones, now ironic, now
compassionate, now angry, now judicious. Such works, one may
say, proclaim that they are literature by being quite good
literature. Since it is highly probable that the writer knew
what he had done and wanted it that way, we can legitimately
infer the intention from the deed. In cases like this, it
may seem that we can for all practical purposes dispense with
the appeal to intention."-1-3 Like Dickie, Beardsley has a
notion of good art quite separate from his alleged ideal of
intention .
Aristotle's mysterious element is, of course, unity.
Berkeley speaks of uniformity amidst variety, and Allan
Casebier speaks of internal relations .
J.O. Urmson hints at an absolute standard in art when he
takes as manifest that "one would not wish to hear a group
1 fiimprovisation of an opera." Kant, Hume, and Frank Sibley
discuss incorrect judgment lying in the viewer's state of
mind, as if there is, after all, an absolute standard of
judgment. Maurice Mendelbaum discusses standards of
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greatness in art, and Kenneth Clark writes of genius.
Eduard Hemslick mentions two undefinable elements: art
as an end in itself, and the specific character of each
1 7color.- ' Clement Greenberg' s idea of good art includes
"painterly"
elements: "loose, rapid handling, or the look of
it... large and conspicuous rhythms. "1 He speaks of the
evolution of Western art to this painterliness, as if it is
the climax of the history of art. Michael Fried, likewise,
calls Minimalism part of "the history almost the natural
history -- of Hegel also sees art as the
evolution of spirit.
For David Carrier, the mysterious element in art is
expression. Morris Weitz speaks of the "perennially
flexible, the perennially debatable, and the irreducibly
vague," w three separate aspects of art, none of them closed
by set criteria. Marshall Cohen abandons the search for a
O 1
theory of art.
Marcel Duchamp, although professing not to believe in
art, has "these doubts about the value of the judgments which
decided that all these pictures should be presented to the
Louvre, instead of others which weren't even considered. "^
Here, he hints at other values that are not being used by the
established judges of art .
Schopenhauer sees art as an expression of the Ideas
(Platonic Forms) of things. Frederick Copleston says that
Vthe intellectual idea, or significant form, does not alone
define an artwork. There is "something else, behind and
beyond it, supporting it and constituting the ground for its
existence."23 It is this elusive quality of art for which I
search: the quality that was known before it was spoken. I
do not seek to force an opening in the history of art for my
work, but rather to explain, in large part to myself, the
urgency I feel to produce work, and the reverence I feel in
the presence of works of art. Socrates himself declared a
great love for the work of Homer, a love that he couldn't
explain with his own theory.
The task of this paper is, then, to determine three
things: what this elusive element in art is, or at least is
due to, what the nature of judgment is, and whether judgment
of art is possible. All this will, I hope, explain my own
work, which I consider an intuitive inquiry into the same
issues .
In order to pursue these three goals, I will first
discuss in depth the three aesthetic theories that are of
interest to me: Plato's, Kant's, and Dewey's, and explain why
I find them inadequate. I will then describe some trends in
modern thought and attribute them to what I see as a failure
of individual judgment. Then I will question traditional
morality and find fault with the current state of the
artworld. I will attempt to criticize the feminist
perspective that is closest to my own, and also Ernest
Becker's science of man, which is also very close to me.
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Then, in chapter nine, after criticizing my favorite
theoricians, I will begin to offer an idea of my own. I will
try to show that opposition, hierarchy, and morality are
merely subdivisions of experience, which is integrated only
under the universal heading of aesthetic wholeness. I will
try to show that the individual is born wholly formed, and is
capable of practicing judgment, and that the integration of
judgments is more important to the artworld than establishing
masterpieces is. I will try to show that works of art can be
distinguished from non-works of art. I will use the case of
cuteness, because it is appropriate to the subject matter of
my thesis paintings (babies) , as an example of the complexity
of some of the issues discussed here. I will conclude with a
study of my own thesis work.
Please pardon the simultaneously impersonal and selfish
nature of this work. I have always wanted to attempt a
serious philosophical inquiry, and whether I succeed or not,
I feel obliged to take advantage of the excellent assistance
that my advisors at R.I.T. can offer me in this endeavor. I
am especially grateful to John Morreall, whose lectures and
writings have been one of the bright spots of my study here,
and who has helped me form my own opinions, and to Phil
Bornarth, who has responded to my work in a very satisfying
manner and helped me think. Thanks also to Bruce Sodervick,
who set me on track at the beginning, to Heather Erwin, Nora
Folkenflik, Laurie Schoeffler, Robb Westbrook, and Mom and
Dad, for reading and suggesting. Thanks to Shamra
Vll
Westbrook for giving me peace of mind for the whole school
year, and to Chris, Bets, Mike, Rob, Katie for helpful
discussions, and Ray for all that canvas. Most of all, of
course, I wish to thank but more about that later...
Step One: Plato takes art on a superficial level, denying its
ability to express the abstract or absolute.
In the analogy of the cave in Book VII of The
Republic, Plato describes prisoners with their legs and necks
chained, with a fire casting shadows over a wall where people
and wooden animals seem to walk. The prisoners see only the
shadows of themselves and the objects, and hear only the echo
of the passing people. The so-called objective world would
consist of the shadows of the images.
Plato describes one of the people being loosed from his
chains and looking toward the light. He is blinded,
continues to think the shadows are true, and considers
reality to be the illusion. Then, as he grows accustomed to
the light, he is able to see reality for what it is. He
pities the other unenlightened people in the cave. He will
no longer "care for such honours and glories, or envy the
possessors of
them,"1 as the people of the cave, who give
prizes on the ability to judge the world of mere shadows . To
the slaves of the illusion of reality, the person who had
seen the truth appears stupid in his inability to see in the
darkness of the cave. They consider it better not to attempt
to look beyond the cave, and kill anyone who tries to lead
others to enlightenment .
Plato is very explicit in pointing out the parallels for
his analogy. The cave is the world we live in and perceive
with our senses, and the fire that casts shadows on the side
of the cave is the sun. The "journey upwards"" is "the
ascent of the soul into the intellectual world."2 The man
who attempts to lead himself upwards into the world of
reality, or pure thought, then, is the philosopher. The
philosopher is not only "unwilling to descend to human
affairs,"3 but also has difficulty functioning if "he is
compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places,
about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is
endeavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never
yet seen absolute justice."4
Meanwhile, in Book X, Plato denounces art. There are
ideas, or Forms of objects, that make up the real world, the
world of contemplation. The maker of an object makes it
according to the idea or Form of the object. Nobody makes
the actual idea. "How could he?"5 According to Plato, it
would be simple to make everything in the world if it were
possible to hold a mirror up to the whole world. He points
out that instead of actually making the world, one would be
making a mere appearance. "And the painter too is, as I
conceive, just such another a creator of appearances . "
Plato goes on to discuss the carpenter who builds a bed.
He does not speak the truth, because the true bed exists "in
6a
nature, which is made by
god." The carpenter's
bed is built according to the true bed, but the painter' s bed
is derived only from the carpenter's bed, and so it is twice
removed from truth. It is a reflection of a reflection. The
painter can't imitate the Form of bed, but, because he must
use viewpoint and perspective, he can only imitate the
carpenter's bed. From every angle, the bed looks different,
but the real bed is never different from itself. Artists do
not leave anything to posterity because they derive only from
the sensed world, and so can't lead people to virtue. "A
painter .. .will make a likeness of a cobbler though he
understands nothing of cobbling, and his picture is good
enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge
only by colours and figures."
Switching to the object of bridle, Plato continues the
argument. The painter doesn't know the right Form of a
bridle, nor does even the maker of a bridle, but it is the
o
horseman who "knows their right Form."0 The horseman, who
uses the bridle, will tell the bridle-maker how to make it.
The painter will not know from use, or by being instructed by
someone who uses the bridle. "He will no more have true
opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or
badness of his imitations... He will go on imitating without
knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected
therefore to imitate only that which appears to be good to
q
the ignorant multitude."
According to Plato, while math is the work of the rational
principle in the soul, the other parts of the soul are
inferior and far removed from the absolute principles of
calculating, measure, and weight. Plato classes music,
poetry, drama, and painting together as imitative arts. "The
imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has
inferior offspring."1^
The analogy of the cave shows a beautiful, not to say
poetic, vision of the position of philosopher in exile from
society. His is an exile brought on by himself, not for the
sake of that exile, but because of his principles. His
description of the difficulty the philosopher has in
functioning in the human world is moving and calls to mind
many occasions of exile, not only of philosophers and
scientists, but ironically enough, also of artists. His idea
that an artist pleases the ignorant multitude has proven to
be false over the centuries .
Like Socrates and Galileo, even now Salman Rushdie has
been tried and found guilty for his work. Meanwhile, the
self-exile imposed by philosophers is the same sort of self-
exile imposed by artists, consisting of a contempt for the
degraded values of society. As Bob Dylan puts it, "Go ahead
and laugh about him... because he doesn't pay tribute to the
king that you serve." This self-exile is not necessarily
righteous, but it has become a trademark of philosophers and
artists, both of whom are often viewed by the world as crazy.
Two obvious examples are the booing of Beethoven' s 9th
Symphony and the mocking of the Impressionists.
Plato makes another mistake when he gives the ability to
know the Form to the user of the object instead of the maker.
It is as if, at the last minute, he sees that his argument is
leading to the conclusion that the craftsman is as knowing in
his field as the philosopher is in his. To avert this
conclusion, he gives the ability to know to the user as if he
would be more likely to deal with the object in a purely
mental way, and to know it in all its aspects. By making the
bridle' s user the one who knows its true reality, he is
equating the function of the object with its identity. This
is precisely the equation he has tried to avoid by positing
the Forms .
Hi s real mistake is, of course, his endowment of real,
Formal identity to all objects. His attempt to define the
essence of an object becomes ridiculous when he claims that
the bridleness of the object is what makes it a bridle. He
gives an eternal property to useful objects, but still
maintains that we live in a world of illusions. There is no
reason to endow objects with eternal properties if they do
not gain an internal worth from them. If an object offers
insight to objective reality by partaking in some way in that
reality, then it can not be discounted as lacking reality.
If a bridle, for example, is derived from reality, and a
philosopher can ascent to reality through it, then its
function is dual. It acts as a bridle, but also as a vehicle
for enlightenment. If, however, the object partakes of the
Form, but that Form is not knowable through the object, but
is only knowable through geometry which is unchangeable, then
it seems irrelevant to posit the existence of Forms of
objects. Forms of useful objects would have no use in the
eternal, immutable world of reality -
Furthermore, the list of Forms would be endless. The
Form of car, for example, would necessarily exist prior to
the existence of a particular car, since Forms are infinite.
Therefore it would not be the user of the automobile who
would dictate its structure, but rather the inventor. The
inventor, in order to arrive at this design, would need to be
a philosopher and draw from his knowledge of the world of
Forms to actualize a specific car in the world of
reflections. The philosopher must, then, be able to know not
only all objects past and present, but also all future
objects. The philosopher would know all about geometry and
unity, and also all about the world of perception.
New objects, like paintings, come from nowhere, but
according to Plato, must be derived from the Form. If the
painting is not a reflection of a Form, but rather a
reflection of a sensed object, then the painting has no Form
in reality- If it shares the Form of the object it reflects,
then it participates in the Form as well. If the painting
has a form in reality, but is a reflection of a reflection,
then, since each painting can't get a Form in reality after
being painted, because the Form is infinite, then the
painting would be derived from the Form of itself. Its
identity would be as real as the identity of an object, only
once removed from the Form. If, however, the painting does
not derive its identity from its own Form, then there must be
one Form for all paintings. If there is one Form of
paintings, from which all paintings derive their identity,
then that Form must not include content, but merely
structural ideas, or all paintings would look roughly the
same in content. Would there be a Form for mural,
unstretched canvas, miniature, and so on?
Step Two: Kant treats art as subjective, but intellectual.
Although beauty exists only through its arousal of emotion in
a viewer, appreciation of it must be learned.
For Kant, the object only has aesthetic worth by its
effect on the viewer. This effect must be a disinterested
appreciation. The viewer finds pleasure in the awareness of
this appreciation. The object does not cause pleasure as the
initial reaction, but rather causes an objective reaction
first. The viewer makes use of cognitive powers when viewing
aesthetically, so it is an active viewing. The faculties of
mind are applied to sensory experience in search for
objective experience. The imagination binds the data of
consciousness to bring them under a mental concept, which
enables understanding. If the circumstances of viewing are
"right", according to Kant, the judgment of beauty is
necessary. In other words, human minds work alike in
classing objects under concepts, and so all human minds will
agree that something is beautiful, given the right viewing
circumstances . The judgment of beauty means only that a
certain response will arise in specific situations. "If I do
not find the object beautiful, that is no indication of its
not being so. Maybe I am looking at it in the wrong way."
Adorno criticizes Kant for trying to separate pleasure from
the initial response, and for not defining beauty except in
relation to the observer. He suggests that interest is
inherent in disinterestedness, that in its will to avoid
creating an animal-like reaction of desire to the object,
"all art contains in itself a negative moment from which it
tries to get away."2 Adorno' s criticism implies and approach
to making and viewing art that is even more calculated than
Kant's. While Kant is attempting to describe the sensation
of enjoyment not accompanied by desire to have, Adorn
suggests that art must actually try to block this desire,
"the most important taboo in art."3 While Kant's approach
appears unrealis tic in his placing a reaction of
disinterestedness prior to enjoyment not of the object, but
of the harmonic state of mind the object arouses, Adorno
distances the work of art from the reaction to it even more.
Prior to aesthetic enjoyment comes a struggle against animal
desire "to devour". Adorno' s theory, however, includes the
tensions of opposit es that Kant attempts to dispel. For
Adorno, this purely mental pleasure does not embody any of
the tensions that pleasure involves. Every thought evokes
its opposite. "Art renounces happiness for the sake of
happiness, thus enabling desire to survive in art."5 The
simultaneity of opposite emotions
-- sharp awareness of
reality with alienation from reality, and fantasies of power
with a desire for a better world recall Plato's description
of the philosopher in the cave. Adorno speaks of a dialectic
of art and society, even as Plato emphasized dialectic as a
means of ascending to the world of Forms .
Kant can also be criticized for defining beauty merely
in terms of mind. It is not clear what causes the state of
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mind in the viewer if it is not presence of beauty in the
object. If the viewer is reacting to a harmonic relation
between himself and the object, it appears that judgment of
beauty could be inconsistent with different viewers. Kant
says that judgment of beauty can be learned, and, in fact,
must be learned in order that conditions for appreciation of
beauty be right for every viewer.
Like Plato, Kant implies that education leading toward a
purely mental state is necessary for true judgment .
Although Kant's general theory includes the existence of an
unknowable world of real things, which he calls noumena, his
theory of beauty does not appear to include a concept of
absolute beauty.
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Step Three: Dewey treats art as experience but fails to explain
how one experience is superior to another without having
absolute content, or relating to an ideal.
Like Kant, John Dewey emphasizes the idea of harmony,
and the relationship between viewer and object in his
aesthetic theory. He discusses aesthetic experience and art,
but dispenses with the idea of beauty as defining these.
Rather, aesthetic experience is a moment of growth due to
recovery of temporary imbalance. "The moment of passage from
disturbance to harmony is that of intensest life."1 Instead
of being an existing quality in an object, as in Plato' s
theory, or a response to a disinterested Harmony felt
between subject and object, as in Kant's, aesthetic
experience, according to Dewey, is an interested relationship
between person and environment. He describes the
relationship as conscious and purposeful. Emotions signal
actual or impending disequilibrium. Desire for restoring
equilibrium converts emotion to an interest in ends that
would realize harmony. He distinguishes between experience
in general and an experience, which is marked by wholeness
and self-sufficiency. Successful restoration to equilibrium
would yield an experience. The parts of an experience flow
into each other and lead to something. Art is produced
purposely to cause an aesthetic experience, whereas in life
and thought, the aesthetic quality of an experience is an
accidental side-effect.
Dewey does not see art as separate from experience, but
12
as a full expression of the possibilities of experience.
While science attempts to proceed from unknown to known, art
leaps willingly into the unknown. Dewey's idea of art is
praising. "It quickens us from the slackness of routine and
enables us to forget ourselves."3 Artists have as important
a moral function as philosophers, because they keep alive
purpose and meaning that is not evident in everyday life .
Art criticizes indirectly, unlike Philosophy, through
imagined contrasts to reality, and emphasizes the unity and
harmony of nature, as if we could actually be one with
nature. "Only imaginative vision elicits the possibilities
that are interwoven within the texture of the actual."
Although Dewey does point out the active and emotional
nature of aesthetic experience, inconsistencies flaw his
argument. While Kant's description is perhaps too cerebral,
Dewey's is too physical. He describes mental actions as if
they are mere substitutes for the instinctual mechanisms for
restoring equilibrium that humans lack. The determinist
quality of his argument contrasts with his ideals of meaning,
purpose, and harmony. His lament of capitalism's separation
of art and life, caused by placing monetary values on
artworks and using them as status symbols, is as persuasive
now as ever, but his condemnation of everyday life denies its
importance. He argues that the aesthetic quality has been
drained from social life, and refers to reunion with nature,
seeing aesthetic experience as a culmination of natural ebb
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and flow that is missing in social life. While he concedes
that aesthetic experience can be found in everyday life, he
limits meaningful experience to aesthetic experience, calling
everyday life slack and dull. While he seems to find a
oneness with nature desirable, he does not consider it
attainable within the routine of the everyday.
Likewise, while stating that experience is not separate
from art, Dewey separates it by using the term aesthetic for
all uplifting experience. Because he confuses the ideas of
aesthetic experience in craft, in play, and in art, he
actually splits the idea of aesthetic experience into parts.
"Because of the continuity between works of art and everyday
experience... /appreciation of arty7 could be learned."6 If
a continuity between everyday experience and art really
exists, it would seem that appreciation of art would not need
to be learned, but would come as naturally as aesthetic
appreciation of experience. A successful work of art, after
. 7
all, causes "an experience". Having an experience should
not require a certain education. Dewey begins to sound like
Kant in his requiring certain conditions of viewing art.
Dewey states that artists keep purpose and meaning alive that
is not apparent in everyday life. If art and experience both
have aesthetic moments, then the aesthetic in both should
reveal purpose and meaning. Dewey's egalitarian ideal of
aesthetic experience turns out to include a hierarchy of
values. Art is created in order to harmonize experience, and
14
so has a function superior to experience. Consequently, its
appreciation must be taught .
Although Dewey' s theory is helpful in reminding of what
is wrong with separating art from reality, and of what
subtleties art can use in importing ideas, his failure to
offer a distinction between the types of aesthetic experience
leads to confusion. Because response to art results in an
experience, then what defines art is its ability to produce
such an experience. Since this response can be learned,
there must be something that gives at least certain works of
art a consistent aesthetic value. Since the emotional
quality of an experience can also be the result of the mental
process of thinking, perhaps it is thinking about the object
of art that yields an experience, not merely an initial
reaction to it. Learning to think about all objects in a
certain way could lead to a more aesthetic understanding of
the world. The question remains of how to go about thinking
aesthetically, since no definition is offered except for the
reaction by the viewer. Art functions to reveal the
aesthetic qualities of life, and so to criticize society and
lead toward change. In order to achieve its goals better,
art should not be relegated to the museum, according to
Dewey.
Sad- ly, placing the burden of art on its uplifting
function, and intention to bring about an aesthetic
experience, leads to art with overpowering theory. For
example, the Situationist International, a movement lasting
15
from 1957 to 1972, "thought of art as action, as idea, as a
vehicle for change rather than as a commodity. Like the
surrealists, they desired a fundamental change in
consciousness and sought to liberate and reorder everyday
ftlife."0 Like Dewey, they saw art as creation of an
experience, and lamented "the sterility and oppression of the
actual environment and ruling economic and political
system. "y Dewey was ahead of himself in noticing the turning
of objects of art into commodities, and the relation of this
phenomenon with the decline of the aesthetic element in
society. But attempting to class art as being done in order
to be aesthetic, and recommending allowing it to permeate
life, cause two difficulties. First of all, when artworks
are created in order to be aesthetic, and thus uplifting,
then theory replaces emotion as the driving force for
creation. In order to justify the aesthetic quality of a
work of art, the artist must be able to prove its importance
in leading viewers toward a better understanding of the
aesthetics of reality. "The traditional distinction between
critic and visual artist has become so blurred" w because,
according to Vitz and Glimcher, the artist's role as
investigator of perception parallels the scientist's, and
thus must imitate the theoretical, verbal form of scientific
expression. Scientific experiments and modernist paintings
are no longer self-explanatory. This conversion of art into
another science can be seen as one possible result of a
16
theory stressing the use of art as a vehicle for
understanding possible improvements of everyday life. Then
art does become inaccessible without the necessary education.
As Winnie the Pooh asks, when he tries to say
"Aha" in a
meaningful way, "XI suppose it's just practice,' he thought,
'I wonder if Kanga will have to practice too so as to
understand it.'"11
The issue of removing art from galleries and allowing it
to become a more universal experience brings other problems
with it. Instead of freeing itself from the status of a
commodity by becoming part of reality instead of remaining
distinct, different art movements become assimilated into the
mainstream more readily. Advertising borrows images and
ideas from art, and becomes considered an art in itself.
"Art" becomes a descriptive term for the general glut of
images. The issue of enhancing the aesthetic quality of
everyday life is quite separate from a plan for pasting
images on every wall. In some places a mural would help, but
in others a coat of whitewash would be just the thing.
Questioning the aesthetics of materials and use of them may
be more important, for example, than an attempt to enlighten
by random placement of public sculpture made of red metal.
Instead of plopping self-sufficient statements here and
there, in other words, it may be more important to integrate
experience as a whole .
The group took their argument to an extreme. They
"refused and negated the concept of art as a separable,
17
exhibitable enterprise."12 By denying the interdependence of
art and life, theorizing movements lose the distinction
between art and life altogether. Predicting minimalism, the
Situationists insisted that art "must prec isely cease to be
works of art . There is no such thing as Situationism or a
Situationist work of art."13
Step Four: Issues in modern art strip aesthetic value of any
absolute identity.
Much of recent art continues to be concerned with the
borders between art and life. By attempting to "unpack the
prejudices"1
of earlier art, artists seek to show that
barriers between art and life are contrived. Christopher
Lasch offers a clear analysis of minimalist art, in which he
describes the retreat of art from reference to the world or
the self. Minimalism involves an elimination of values
previously considered crucial to art: patterns, subjectivity,
passion, craftsmanship. The minimalist artist denies his own
separation from the world. In reaction to advertising, with
its deluge of images, which obscures the distinction between
images and reality, the artist sees himself as stripped of
identity, interchangeable with any other image. Minimalist
art reflects this fusion of self with world in its denial of
the reality of an inner self and an exterior world, and so
its consequent denial of any distinction between subject and
o
object .
Minimalist art attempts both to deny separation of self from
reality, and to achieve self-contained, non-referential
artwork. An article by Lawrence Weschler notes Frank
Stella' s insistence that a painting should be nothing more
"3
than a painting, or "a wall". His insistence that a
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painting is only paint on a canvas shows a desire for self-
sufficiency. Dewey's ideal of the self-sufficient moment
comes to mind. "The artist was trying to see how few
conventions he could retain and still end up with a good
painting."4 Although Stella's style has changed a good deal
recently in keeping with his avoidance of a personal
signature, his minimalist ideals remain intact. His ability
to apply them to a new brand of constructed surface lies in
his tenet that "the painterly discourse has to remain purely,
pristinely, and serenely
self-referential."5 In his new
phase, this isolation from tradition manifests itself in an
attempt to load his paintings with pattern and shape oddly
enough he has passed from his protractor shapes of 1968 to
glorified French curves without noticing a connection but
retain their existence as mere paintings. "There comes a
point, if you keep taking things away like that and you
organize what's left that strictly, that you almost don't
have a painting
left."6 Eliminating the painting-ness of the
painting is as threatening to a minimalist as subjectivity.
A commitment to stop making paintings, to a real belief in
the end of the function of art, would be as self-affirming as
painting the figure. "You get so involved in your system of
beliefs,"
says Stella, "and your commitment that you just
n
can't separate yourself from your
work."' On discovering
this commitment, Stella realized that it was time to turn to
something new, and not so emotionally binding. Like other
20
recent artists, he now understands that the painting will
stand simply as a painting whether or not someone drags in a
lot of associations, because associations "no longer threaten
the painting's reality as a painting."8 Still, though he has
moved from studies on the two-dimensionality of the canvas to
even more ambiguous works in their ability to hover "in and
out of the world,
"y his paintings remain self-referential.
Like Stella's so-called constructions, the sign
paintings of Mary Boochever and Moira Dryer attempt to push
the limits between art and life. As in Stella's work, their
paintings are self-referential, but allow for unlimited
associations. Like Stella in his move away from minimal
treatment of the canvas to a formal drafting of minimal
space, Boochever and Dryer deal in structures with a
contrived found appeal in order further to confuse the
borders of art and reality. Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe, in a
review of their show, rejects the term beauty in describing
Dryer's work in typically obscure and rambling language.
"Why would one want to look at a work that was not beautiful
in the first place?" he begins, but calling the work
beautiful could also trouble the artist because "beauty tends
to be linked with frivolity." He decides that the word, and
also the idea that "frivolity can not be important, "^ should
be abandoned. We wonder why he doesn't work out some of
these ideas off the page, but then realize that there would
not be much left of his article without the several options
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for each thought . In a manner common to those who do not
want to inflict standards on others, mainly because they have
none to inflict, he retracts everything he posits. Instead
of accepting frivolity as a positive value and allowing
beauty to retain a suggestion of that frivolity, or otherwise
attempting to redefine beauty, he instead throws the notion
of beauty, with all its overtones, out the window, and after
it any criticism of frivolity- He also slips in, in the form
of a question, the idea that everything worth looking at is
beautiful. Without discussing beauty, he dismisses it, and
yet manages to retain it. It is this valueless indecision
that defines the paintings under discussion better than any
definite assertions could. Unlike Stella's "dreamily
idealist"
notion that "What you see is what you see,"11 the
idea behind these sign paintings is that "inferiority is
always present but, as such, always deferred into a concept
of exteriority- It is a deconstruction of the idea of
inferiority." There is no distinction between interior and
exterior. Gilbert-Rolfe continues, "It is also a
deconstruction of the (historicist) concept of usefulness.
But this is probably less important. Who cares about such
things other than those who theorize about the world through
work, through religions founded on the image of production
and, therefore, with the moral narrowly conceived of
course above all
else."x In his half-hearted way,
Gilbert-Rolfe rejects work, religion, and morality as
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instruments of thinking about and trying to make sense of the
world. In discussing Boochever' s painting called Brilo,
which consists of a gradation from peach to brown to black
painted on an artist's apron, Gilbert-Rolfe draws an allusion
of work, "where that work is the non-productive production
that is art. Art is something for people to look at in their
spare time, a production designed for moments of non-
production. This is the sense in which the work of art is
always a deconstruction of the conditions of production when
viewed historically."13 He continues in mentioning the apron
connected with different types of work: carpenters, domestic
servants, and slaves, and their wages. His contention is
that there is no factual history, but that the ability of a
work of art to be a product without participating in
production strips the history of production of any factual
meaning. Furthermore, the ability of an apron to recall
members of all levels of society, and endless other
references, makes it "a kind of ultimate sign of apron-ness,
stripping it of identity, exhausting all its meanings,
collapsing them into one
another." So art is no longer
satisfied with being only self-referential, but because
anything can refer to anything else, it becomes
indistinguishable from everything else. Interior and
exterior become indistinguishable.
Gilbert-Rolfe expands on the idea of flow in discussing
Dryer's Portrait # 421. He describes a texture and material
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that are "frozen, hard, continuous, fluid,"15 and contends
that placement of a frame would be arbitrary. By being
titled a portrait, but being completely non-representational,
the painting "disperses the idea of the person."16 The
continuity, flow, and dissolution, eliminate the idea of the
painting or person as an entity separate from anything else.
Like signs, the paintings "never exist in themselves" but
exist "to point to something
else."17 The only thing that is
not a sign is the self, "and even that disappears once the
concept of self is reduced to a list of psychological
urges."18 According to Gilbert-Rolfe, the self is
inseparable from the rest of the world, stripped of its
identity by scientific and historical description, and
rendered powerless by political structures beyond the control
of the individual. Like the individual in society, the
artist can't find identity in art. "These artists are out of
i q , ,
control."1^ Reflecting a similar air of acceptance of social
conditions out of his control is Robert Rauschenberg, whose
new works uncritically "seem to embrace our technological
on
condition .
u
Despite their failure to separate art and its values from
reality and its values, artists place art on a separate moral
plane. Art is considered to be outside of morality and so is
not responsible to any authority for its content. Like a
journalist, the artist merely reports on the conditions of
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the times, or predicts them. During the recent controversy
regarding photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres
Serrano, this amorality of art was called into question by
Senator Jesse Helms and others. Although cloaked in
backwoods conservatism like William Buckley, Jr . ' s when he
comments that Mapplethorpe' s photographs show "the kind of
thing men do to each other while communicating AIDS,"21 the
question raised by the opponents of the exhibition are
important. Do works of art have to comply with any objective
standard of morality, and more to the point "are we taking
the position that any creation executed by an artist is 'art'
and that it should be immune from criticism?"22 Artists
seem to have adopted a position not as moral leaders or
critics, but as victims of a tide of immorality. Instead of
resisting the deluge to the senses of images of violence and
pornography, they are swept up into it . They present their
own fatalistic participation in the hypocrisy of a society
that imposes laws but doesn't protect as an argument against
it, but this message may not be enough. "The depiction of
sodomy is primarily a statement, rather than a work of
art,"
says Buckley- By distinguishing between art and non-
art, Buckley avoids the issue of whether art is subject to
morality. Instead he makes it a moral obligation to discern
between what is and isn't art, allowing only what passes this
moral standard to be art. In other words, something must
have a certain kind of content to be art . Were we to accept
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this idea, we would have to find a more suitable executor of
discretion than Buckley, who believes that censorship is one
way for a society to show "We care."24
Even those not in favor of cutting all public funding
often refer to the Mapplethorpe exhibit as an error in
judgment. Requesting "more examples of individual moral
judgment,"" Meg Greenfield puts moral discretion in the
hands of artists and curators. She acknowledges that "a
great deal of enduring art and thought was initially
shocking, even offensive."26 This comment has been not only
a standby for artists defending creative license, but a
creed. "Outrage has become routinized in art outrage has
become the very product of art rather that a byproduct .
"
The idea that art responds to society is lost in the call for
moral discretion in art. Art is considered to have a higher
responsibility than the life that goes on around it. Rather
than to document life, and question established values, art
is seen to be subject to the laws of the state, whether
legally or by its own integrity.
Artists, on the other hand, rally around
artists' right and
even obligation to shock. Indeed, one must simply flip
through an art magazine to see images that might have once
seemed shocking, but now are obligatory.
Abaknaowicz'
s
headless sculptures stare blankly, an ad for Tamara theatre
boasts, "We call it the 'Living
Movie'
. Come prepared for
wild, voyeuristic fun. Wear comfortable
shoes," Jean
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Fautrier's bust is half obliterated with parallel scratches,
Jasper Johns includes a severed arm, St. Lewis lists as his
medium "human skull with bottlecaps, sterling, semi-precious
stones and found objects", and yet, images of violence and
bloodshed are generally accepted now. It is the attacks on
sexual and religious norms that provoke outrage. It is not
considered shocking that art has adopted a position of
reflecting the attitudes of society rather than attempting to
change the course of history- In the same magazine I was
just leafing through, I find also a row of 13 very regular
metal logs labeled as sculpture by Walter de Maria, a
wonderful pedestal for a missing sculpture by Chillida,
Yamaguchi's flaccidly decorative collage with large sperm.28
Finding that shock has "been done", artists turn to
minimalism and deconstruction to strip art of meaning. Their
messages become indecipherable, even to the educated eye.
They become a lesson in the meaninglessness of modern life --
the loss, in fact, of the aesthetic quality in society.
Mapplethorpe' s desire to bombard the eye with shocking images
reflects not so much a desire to shock, but a desire to use
the medium, as newscasters do routinely, to habituate society
to the image, to strip it of meaning in other words, and thus
p q
to gain its acceptance. J While 2 Live Cru is being banned,
after all, the porn shop down the street prospers. It makes
no sense for art to maintain moral standards while society
fails to. Critics have asked not so much if art is subject
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to morality, but also if art has a function other than the
reflection of reality .
The exemption of art from moral laws becomes complicated
by the increasingly nebulous borders between art and life.
Performance art, when taken out of the context of the gallery
or stage, becomes the actions that make up reality. Gilbert
and George live their performance. These artists point out
the pointlessness of any morality. They act out their
statement against moral and aesthetic values. Perhaps their
mistake is in distinguishing moral values, which are based on
ideas of harmony, order, unity, and good, from aesthetic
values. The question artists and their critics raise is, of
course, what is art?
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Step Five: Conventional morality does not give a sufficient
impetus for action.
"Plants and people and animals grow because people are kind
to them." (Mr. Rogers, episode 1585)
After having asked the question, "What is art?", I find
it painfully plain that the question is really "What is
life?" In order to distinguish art from life, if such a
distinction is possible, we must discuss both. I will
discuss only the aspects that I consider crucial to judgment.
Kant's epistemology consists of an inquiry into reason
and intellect and their functions. He discusses what can be
known and how we know what we know. He also questions
whether metaphysics can exist as a science. In order to
determine what can be known, Kant begins by categorizing
knowledge as a. priori (known independently of experience) and
a posteriori (known based on experience) , and as synthetic
(connecting subject and predicate using a principle) and
analytic (connecting subject and predicate by definition) .
According to Kant, an a. priori proposition is necessary
(holds true for all possible experience) and universal (there
is no possible exception). These features can't be arrived
at empirically, because experience can't illustrate that
something cannot be otherwise. Kant contradicts Hume's
interpretation of cause and effect as repetition causing
habitual connection of two events in the mind. Kant points
out that we would not attribute universality to the
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connection of cause and effect if it were learned from
experience : "Whence could experience derive its
certainty, if all the rules, according to which it proceeds,
were always themselves empirical, and therefore
contingent?"1
If we remove all empirical features from an object, remaining
are the ideas of occupied space and substance, which can't be
removed. Likewise, the universality of rules of nature
derives from concepts in the intellect. The concepts of the
intellect allow experience, in the sense that it would be
impossible to interpret sensed data without the synthesizing
of the intellect .
All a. priori judgments are synthetic, according to Kant,
because they consist of applying concepts of the mind, which
are a priori, to experience. Even math is synthetic because
it must be applied to observed figures . "The greatest part
of the business of our reason," he concludes, "consists in
the analysis of the concepts which we already have of
objects."2 For Kant, metaphysics is an attempt to understand
the principles of a. priori synthesis.
Although he states that "it would be even more absurd not
to admit the existence of things in themselves, or to suggest
that one kind of experience is the only possible method of
knowing objects,"3 he adds that it is not possible to know
these things in themselves. Attempting to know things in
themselves with our limited intellect would be to extend the
fallacy that "principles of the possibility of experience be
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considered general conditions of things in themselves."4
Since experience is given identity by the concepts of
the mind, then it is natural to wonder what is real behind
the experienced phenomena, Kant continues. The only way for
reason to be complete is through the concept of things in
themselves. Though we can't know these things in themselves
and can't conceive of the kind of reason a god would have,
Kant allows a boundary where both pure thought and experience
can coexist. The boundary is seeing the world "as if it were
the work of a supreme will and intellect."5 Kant sees the
idea of a supreme being as useful. It protects us from
materialism, naturalism, fatalism. It is tied in with
freedom and morality.
Morality for Kant is the categorical imperative: that a
rational being act in such a way that he could will his
action to be a universal law. Prudence is choosing the means
to happiness, but morality commands certain conduct for its
own sake. A person is an end in himself, and so can't serve
as a means, "because otherwise nothing whatever could be
found that would possess absolute value."6 He rules out
suicide, false promises, and neglect of one's "capacities for
greater
perfection."7 He speaks of a "realm of ends,"8 or a
union of rational beings by laws, which each person belongs
to as lawgiver, as well as obeyer of laws. He mentions the
dignity of morality. "Neither nature nor art has anything
which, if dignity were lacking, they could put in its
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place. "y The autonomy of the will is the highest principle
of morality, and autonomy of the will depends on freedom.
Kant's epistemology is very similar to Plato's in one
sense. Kant and Plato both lodge an important part of
experience in the mind. Kant's functions of the mind order
experience. For Plato, learning is recollection of our
knowledge of the Forms . Though we experience through
perception, our perceptions of the world are not reliable.
The recollected Forms, however, are reliable. Recollection
of the Forms, or a. priori knowledge, gives order to
experience by pointing out that the sensed world is not the
limit of our understanding, and by giving a point to reason.
Likewise, Kant uses the a. priori laws of the intellect not to
prove, but to extrapolate higher uses of reason.
I find several problems in the practical application of
Kant's moral and epistemological argument. He speaks of the
importance of dignity, but also of the rational being as the
highest end in itself. Reason dictates choices that make
logical sense when applied as universals . Choosing moral
actions rationally and logically is a possibility of each
human mind because the rational mind follows certain
principles, like cause and effect. Each person, then, will
follow certain rules, if he acts rationally, and with
morality in mind as the highest good. I find Kant's mistake
in placing morality as the highest function of rationality,
and rationality as the highest function of man. If morality
is the highest good, then the highest function of the
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rational being is to be morally good, which is the same as
being rational in all circumstances requiring moral judgment.
Now, if morality makes rational sense, and the rational being
pursues it, then he pursues the same end as all other humans.
In other words, he seeks to obey the same laws that any
rational being acting in accordance with his rationality
would obey in the same circumstances. Because the actions
follow rational moral law, the important thing is that they
follow the law, not the specific action in itself. The
action' s specificity loses its importance, just as the doer' s
specific rationality is not as important as the rationality
it has in common with all mankind. Rationality, then, is
reduced to logic, insofar as it adheres to laws dictated a
priori . Freedom of will is subservient to logic. Because
actions are judged logically, the specific circumstances are
not seen by Kant as important .
Reason' s failure to aid in determining correct actions
presents another problem in the practical application of
Kant's argument. Kant's idea of laws of reason includes
their own negation. By positing these laws as mental
constructs, Kant allows for the possibility of alternate
mental laws. Time, for example, can be reasonably shown not
to exist, at least as an absolute entity, as Einstein has
proven. Kant's own positioning of natural laws in the mind
has allowed for mind-boggling expansion of the powers of mind
to create alternate realities.
^Though Kant considers it a moral duty to develop one's
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talents, his specific talents, again, are subservient to
morality. The specificity of the individual serves his
general humanity- In this case, however, there is a
contradiction between moral duties. For example, pursuing a
talent may involve self-sacrifice. That is, often a form of
art involves inhalation of deadly substances (as in oil
painting) or maltreatment of the body (as in dancing) , and,
moreover, often artworks place their author in fear of his
life, as we have seen in the case of Salman Rushdie. Self-
preservation and pursuit of one's talents, then, can
conflict. Pursuit of morality also ofen conflicts with self-
preservation. Often moral pursuits set the individual
against society or the norm, and result in the individual's
death by execution, assassination, or suicide. Often pursuit
of morality involves dangerous feats of heroism.
In other words, morality can not be the highest good if a
rational being is an end in himself. If the rational being
is an end, then he can't be used as a means, according to
Kant . This argument is good when we think of sacrificing
other people for personal ends. However, if a rational being
creates a cause that he considers an end greater than
himself, then according to Kant he can't use himself as a
means in achieving that higher end. This rule inhibits
freedom of will because it discards our ability to sacrifice
ourselves for a greater good, unless we see our bodies as
mere tools of our minds. If we think of body as separate
from mind, however, the body can be sacrificed without
34
sacrificing the rational being. This, then, could be
extended to other bodies in the way of our pursuit of a
higher end, and so does not solve the moral problem. The
separation of mind from body has always posed the question of
the importance of the preservation of the body.
Kant's argument in favor of a kingdom of ends, likewise,
is perfect in moral treatment of others, but is inadequate in
moral treatment of the self. In fact, considering each
rational being an end in itself involves an implicit self-
sacrifice to those ends, in order that their rights can be
preserved. The rational being, then, is important only
insofar as he has voluntarily subjected himself to
preservation of all other rational beings. This subjection
of the rational being to the idea of his own identity as an
end parallels the moral action, whose importance lies solely
in its subjection to moral laws.
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Step Six: Government contradicts morality.
Kant's argument can be solved with the placement of a
different highest good, which integrates specific morality,
rationality, and talent, in such a way that each may be
sacrificed for the greater good.
Suicide is an issue that points out the futility of
moral government. Glanville Williams traces the history of
the law regarding suicide in America, England, and in various
religions. The position varies from a belief in the sanctity
of life, to a condemnation of cowardice, to the idea of the
duty of the citizen. The discussion of the attempt to apply
laws to someone who is clearly no longer a functioning member
of society, or who at least is trying to make an exit from
it, reveals the ludicrous paradox of a state's desire to
protect a citizen by punishing it.
Likewise, and here we see another flaw in Kant's system,
prison and execution are a problem-ridden means of
punishment. Kant's laws, extracted from reason, can be
written down and enforced. His criminals, one might suppose,
have sacrificed their status as rational ends by not acting
as rational lawmakers, and so may be dispensed with
accordingly. However, punishment, for Kant, does retain
respect for the person as end in himself. That is, he cannot
be punished for a greater good, like example setting, but
only because he has committed a crime. He loses, not his
natural selfhood, but his civil selfhood. Thus Kant
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recommends punishment appropriate to the crime, including the
death penalty for murder. "His death, however, must be kept
free from all maltreatment."1 According to Kant, failure to
punish criminals makes all the members of society guilty in
the crime .
Any moral system, however, when applied to government
becomes fraught with inconsistencies, because of the
particularities of each case, and the fallibility of human
judgment . When Kant takes judgment from the actor and gives
it to the justice system, he denies the greatest aspect of
his system: the individual's ability to judge for himself,
and his status as lawgiver. Kant points out the "whoever
steals anything makes the property of all insecure; he
9
therefore robs himself of all security in
property." Kant
intends that retaliation should take the form of confiscating
the criminal's property for a time while he serves the state.
Kant strips actions of their dignity. When the criminal
forfeits security, he does this in an actual way without the
necessity of retribution. Police action renders Kant's
statements false, because judgment is taken form the
individual and put in the hands of the state. The individual
never has to suffer the real consequences of his action,
because the police will remove him and give him a sentence.
He will never have to live in insecurity, after all, or meet
the people he has robbed face to face. Retribution makes
crime an integral part of a system beyond the control of the
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individual. Police cause crime by assuming the need to
prevent it, whereas, if the individual were obligated to be a
moral agent on his own, he would be forced by practical need,
to oblige. When Kant says that "all false art, all vain
wisdom lasts its time, but it destroys itself in the end,"3
he speaks of the absolute value of human work. When he
discusses punishment, he denies that absolute value.
When Kant points out that suicide is not logical as a
universal law, he does not allow the possibility of its
appropriateness as a law with conditions. It could be
universally lawful for all mass-murderers to commit suicide
for example. When the moralizer does take conditions into
account, however, his system becomes even more inconsistent,
as Kant obviously was aware when he avoided this pitfall.
Those Christians, for example, who are against abortion
because of the sanctity of the life of the fetus, but allow
abortion in the case of rape or incest, actually discredit
God's ability to work, albeit mysteriously. They do not
accept the possibility of good arising from evil. They, in
fact, deny the sanctity of life with their attempt to
reconcile popular scientific morality with religion.
As George Bernard Shaw explains, the root of the problem of
crime is "the belief that virtue is something to be imposed
on us from without... Living virtuously is an art that can be
learnt only by living in full responsibility for our own
action; .. .society must, whether it likes it or not, put up
with a certain burden of individual error... The
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disastrous people are the indelicate and conceited busybodies
who want to reform criminals and mould children' s characters
by external pressure and abortion."4
Again, the sanctity of life is not protected in war.
Although against abortion, "the Catholic religion permits
killing in the course of a just war, and this killing may
even involve infants who are in no wise responsible for the
war."5 It is this inconsistency in law that we have been
discussing. The law decrees that murder is illegal, and then
mandates it in the case of war. The arbitrary borders of the
map, redrawn periodically, dictate the value of certain
lives . Even the individual soldier does not have power of
authority over his participation in war. It is assumed that
no soldier will fight if given a choice, and so the soldiers
are ordered to fight, when and where, and stripped of
personal conscience by being clothed in the anonymous garb of
regimentation. Meanwhile, those who give the orders do not
have to see the consequences of their decisions. As Gandhi
wrote in a letter to his son, violence has "two aspects
physical and passive. Passive violence in the form of
discrimination, oppression, exploitation, hate, anger and all
the subtle ways in which it manifests itself gives rise to
physical violence in society."6 War begins within society,
in its way of thinking about its members, non-members, and
their individual judgment.
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Step Seven: Science and art attempt a valueless analysis of
the world.
"The fairest thing we can experience is the mysterious. It
is the fundamental emotion which stands at the cradle of true
art and true science." (Einstein, The World as T See It. p.
5)
In their book, Modern Art and Modern Science. Paul Vitz
and Arnold Glimcher illustrate the parallel course in art and
science of an analytical reductionist attitude toward vision.
They suggest that abstraction, or reduction of information,
shows an interest in elementary levels of perception. The
flattening of the picture plane shows the awareness and
attempt not to conceal that art is an illusion. Theorizing,
not just by critics, but by the artists themselves, reflects
a new awareness of the historical accomplishments of art.
Vitz and Glimcher argue that historians have neglected the
profound influence science has had on art, and that modern
art is, in fact, not interpretable without taking this
influence into account.
They cite many examples of scientific and artistic works
in order to track the path away from synthetic-hierarchical
thought towards analytic-recuctionist thought. While
analytic-reductionist thought attempts to break phenomena
down to find underlying parts, thus assuming a more basic
level will explain observations, the synthetic-hierarchical
thought of the Middle Ages and Renaissance finds higher
concepts to explain phenomena. Lower objects derive their
identity form higher concepts, and the parts are all
40
interdependent in forming a whole.
According to Vitz and Glimcher, the paintings of the
Renaissance show a hierarchical organization of elements so
that one area of the canvas has more importance, while modern
paintings ofen have surfaces that have no areas of greater
importance, creating "a kind of visual egalitarianism. "1
They point out discoveries in science in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries of activity below eye level: cells,
chromosomes, genes, molecules, atoms, elements, neutrons,
protons, the unconscious. Compared with the work of Newton,
whose work of greatest impact were his laws of nature, which
explained and integrated phenomena, modern science offers
insight into reality by finding smaller particles. They
point out that, although Newton' s work on light revealed the
existence of particles of light, this work was insignificant
p
to an "aristocratic, hierarchical
society."^- (These
particles, now called quanta, have naturally enough become
the material of recent ground-breaking discoveries in
physics.) Vitz and Glimcher also show the breaking down of
science itself into many specialized fields as a symptom of
the dominance of analytical thought, and point out the
parallel division of art into many schools.
In order to show the parallel between art and science,
Vitz and Glimcher focus on the study of vision itself,
pointing out parallel interpretation of basic visual elements
such as light, depth, color, space, time, form, optical
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illusion, randomness, redundancy. They show the influence of
science on art in a literal way, even to the borrowing of
science's "iconography". They try to show that the collapse
of the hierarchical system that supported moral and social
purposes for art brought artists to express a new view of
vision, so that art could have a new function as a tool for
broadening perception.
Vitz and Glimcher quote Flaubert's wish to write a book
about nothing. This stripped down ideal has been actualized
more recently by modern artists like Ad Reinhardt and Andy
Warhol, both of whose work is compared to scientific
experiments on sensory deprivation being done at the time.
Examples of paintings that exactly resemble scientific
studies on vision are shown, and movements in art that were
founded on scientific ideals are cited: Suprematism, Bauhaus,
De Stijl, Constructivism. Vitz and Glimcher compare Manet's
slight skewing of objects, Cezanne's fracturing of space, and
Duchamp' s study of movement with Muybridge's photographic
sequences of stills of a moving object, and
Morey' s time
lapse studies. They compare Picasso's fractured portraits
with doubly exposed photographs . They point out an almost
simultaneous development of non-Euclidean geometry and
Cezanne's and van Gogh's spatial distortions.
I have given a thorough description of Vitz and
Glimcher' s thesis because it raises many issues without
providing an adequate explanation for them. By focussing on
what they refer to as the perceptual quality of modern art,
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they obscure the conceptual quality of it. Their own
approach to the issue is an analytic-reductionist one: they
reduce the issues in art to one, that of perception, and
systematically analyze examples that prove a parallel between
science and art. They dismiss arguments about art based on
social change without acknowledging that social change and
science are interrelated. There is no question that art and
science have made a parallel journey, but by limiting their
discussion to the science of perception, they deny the impact
of other forms of science on art .
Vitz and Glimcher quote Cezanne as saying, "One must
make an optic. One must see nature as no one has seen it
before you," without assessing the implications of the
statement. They point out an important distinction between
art works simply about nothing, and art works "about
themselves, for the questions raised are far more complex
than the simple absence of a familiar
subject." Since
artworks are not simply about nothing, they are "self-
referential". They refer to themselves and to their role in
art history- Vitz and Glimcher quote Alan Spiegel: "Any
understanding of a situation is always limited by the way the
eye chooses to see
it."J
The attempt to see nature as nobody has before, has led
directly to a condition in which art is no longer simply
about nature, but about the viewer's position in nature, and,
more importantly, about art. The theorizing that Vitz and
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Glimcher mention represents the self-analysis of art. The
artist's inability to escape his point of view renders him
powerless to confront nature. The desire to do a painting
about nothing, epitomized by Ad Reinhardt, and seen, in a
feeling version, in the black paintings of Mark Rothko,
reflects a desire to have the last word, to be done with it,
to end it all. Ad Reinhardt claimed to paint simply the last
painting anyone can paint.6 This finality is mirrored, not
in sensory deprivation, but in the creation of weaponry so
powerful it can destroy everything. The attempt to paint
what nobody has painted is parallel, not to studies in
vision, but to studies in technology. It is the simultaneous
feeling of helplessness in the face of the challenge and the
desire to master the challenge that is reflected in the
attempt to find the final frontier. These desires for
absolute power and final renunciation of power are
crystallized in the Star Wars program of Ronald Reagan --
absolute power in the final frontier. Like the arms race, a
never-ending escalation of scientific discoveries rendered
impotent by their own power, the arts race has been, since
the Impressionists, one ground-breaking discovery after
another. The job of the artist is to understand recent art
history and blow the lid off it.
The idea of visual egalitarianism is also interesting in
company with the breaking down of disciplines into
specialized fragments. It is as if one person can never know
the whole, but can only know a part really well. In society
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this is seen as specialization, not merely in science, but
also, of course, in assembly line production, in the
intellectualizing of all disciplines, and the introduction of
the computer into every field. While possibly rendering the
dissatisfaction of all more equal, science has not done
anything to reduce social stratification. Egalitarianism in
America means that each job is a meaningless part of an even
more obscure whole. At best, as in the case of a journalist
or graphic designer, the worker is allowed to conceive and
execute a product, but the introduction of the computer has
robbed even these positions of the dignity of craftsmanship.
All jobs, from drafting to publishing, are aesthetically the
same, consisting mostly of long hours at the computer,
rearranging elements, "cutting and
pasting"
meaningless parts
to form a whole that doesn't have too much impact on society
unless it's so obscene it generates instant controversy.
Likewise, education has become a necessity for all
disciplines, but not for its own sake or the sake of
increasing common ground between people in a field. Rather,
education has become a way of further removing the whole of a
discipline from the hands of the individual. One will never
be able to understand all the academic mumbo-jumbo behind
each movement of art, but unless he has a degree that shows
he has made an attempt, his own ideas are irrelevant. Vitz
and Glimcher discuss the change in art from painting about
nature to painting about vision, but they don't mention the
stripping of the power of the individual by the
self-
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referential quality of both science and art. They are not
only inaccessible to the uneducated viewer, but even to the
artist or scientist who hasn't read up on the latest
software. Art is, like every other jargon-ridden academic
discipline, an insider's affair.
As one professor put it, "As artists you should have
opinions on issues in art."7 The artist, like the scientist,
is no longer free to work in relative isolation, doing battle
with his own soul, but has an obligation to refer to his
field, to justify his work, and to come up with some new
relevant discovery. Reductionism in science and art are
more than a fascination with analysis of vision: an artist is
no longer trusted to have an autonomous self.
Vitz and Glimcher also choose an approach that doesn't
attempt to impose values on the question of the influence of
science on art. While they point out in closing that the
analytic-reductionist approach has limits and praise Chuck
Close for using analysis in a synthetic fashion, in his
building of a complex whole using analyzed parts, they do not
discuss the quality of work that is simply reductionist, like
the op-art of Robert Rauschenberg, or simply scientific, like
photography. They do not consider that these works, which
comprise only one aspect of artistic work, are not art at
all, but are versions of scientific studies.
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Step Eight: Although feminists accurately criticize random
hierarchies, they merely propose alternate valueless analyses
of the world.
In answer to Vitz and Glimcher' s comparison between art
and science, feminists might point out that this parallel is
inevitable because both art and science reflect the point of
view of the white male, and the progress of that point of
view as recorded by history, another discipline created by
men. "History is a story Western culture buffs tell each
other,"1
as Donna Haraway puts it. However, feminists favor
the analysis of texts in terms of social context and point of
view of the author, but oppose the science of vision and
technological control of nature.
One feminist attack on science criticizes the "all-
knowing"
eye of science. In her article on science, Donna
Haraway traces the progression of the feminist point of view
on science. Beginning with imagining an "invisible
conspiracy of masculine scientists and philosophers replete
9 ...
with grants and
laboratories,"^
who determine objective
reality and "what can count as
knowledge,"0 feminists turned
to deconstruction. Like deconstructionist art critics,
Haraway points out that "inside-outside boundaries in
knowledge are theorized as power moves, not moves toward
truth."4 She criticizes the ideas of objectivity and
scientific method because they attempt a disembodied point of
view and because scientist don't even use them in their work.
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She describes scientific vision as representing an attempt to
see all of nature and control it. She calls for "a successor
science project and a postmodern insistence on irreducible
difference and radical multiplicity of local
knowledges."5
Instead of attempting an all-explaining, organic theory, she
suggests the use of science "not in order to deny meanings
and bodies, but in order to build meanings and bodies that
have a chance for life."6 She harshly criticizes what she
calls disembodied vision, in which the point of view is not
considered a part of the theory, and so the theory is treated
as objective knowledge.
E.A. Grosz likewise condemns what she refers to as
"liberal feminism"7, which attempts to achieve sexual
neutrality- She describes "feminisms of autonomy"8 which
seek to develop "entirely new forms of theory based on
q
women's experiences and perceptions rather than
men's."^ She
defines phallocentrism as a denial of the subjectivity of the
masculine point of view. Accepting the position of the white
male as objective means that masculine values presenting
themselves as universal, truthful, and neutral are imposed on
women. The commitment to a static, objective truth implies
that scientific experimenters are interchangeable, and thus
that the experimenter is not responsible for his results.
The values of truth are described in terms of opposites, for
example, "reason is surreptitiously defined by claiming it is
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not corporeal, not based on passion, nor madness, nor
emotions."10 Grosz says that feminists are attempting to
"devise alternate modes of theorizing in which women' s
i 1
interests and not men's are
represented," that aren't in
search of one absolute truth.
She stresses the importance of context, the
interestedness of observation, and the responsibility of the
observer for what he says. She argues that opposites
perpetuate a hierarchy in which one term is superior to the
other, and insists that feminists cover the middle ground of
"both subject and object, self and other, reason and passion,
mind and
body."12 She says that it is not enough for women
to gain equal entrance to masculine pursuits, but that
feminism should pave the way for a completely new approach to
knowledge, that men must "take back what they have produced
and for us to see that this is only half of the productive
1 "3
possibilities of knowledge .
"-L~>
Donna Haraway also stresses the importance of
accepting the responsibility and limits of vision, and the
specificity of the observer's point of view. She points out
that relativism is the same as objectivity in its claim to
show every angle while accepting no responsibility for point
of view. Her chart of male and female approaches to
knowledge, which she denies are "mutually exclusive", lists,
in almost unintelligible jargon, feminist goals as
"ethnophilosophies, heteroglossia, deconstruction,
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oppositional positioning, local knowledge, and webbed
accounts . "14
Lisa Tickner applies feminism to art history. She
argues a deconstructionist point of view toward art,
condemning the attempt at objectivity, the envisioning of the
artist as hero and the painting as a static entity divorced
of process, the treatment of women as signs, and the
addressing of artworks toward a male audience. Like Grosz,
Tickner chastises males for letting masculinity stand for
humanity. She raises interesting issues of women as audience
when she asks whether the woman viewer is to identify with
the nude "the passive and fetishized spectacle of woman on
i s
screen' J the male voyeur, or both.
While astute in their criticism of the state of affairs in
our time, I find the feminists' arguments presented here to
be guilty of exactly the difficulties they find to be at
fault . While criticizing men in their attempts to see
everything from all points of view, they recommend exactly
the same thing. Although they are right in advising the
observer to be responsible and speak from a body and a point
of view, they deny the possibility of absolutes. They insist
on "irreducible difference and radical multiplicity of local
knowledges."16 They call for a smashing of the old system of
thought the idea of the one, objectivity, universality
and substituting multiple points of view. Instead of calling
for something new, in fact, they are asking to perpetuate the
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breakdown of absolute vision that began, as Vitz and Glimcher
point out, in the mid 1800s and led to relativism, and then
to denial of the power of the self to make judgments. In
science, this denial is reflected in the analytic-
reductionist attempts to study ever smaller particles, simply
to observe. As the larger scene in science becomes more
frightening and institutionalized, beyond the control of the
individual, the scientist turns to the new frontier of the
infinitesimal. The feminist criticism of this form of
scientific inquiry as a masculine attempt to destroy the
world seems harsh, especially as some of the vision-oriented
scientists, like Jacques Cousteau, have turned to nature and
environmentalism .
The feminist desire to fracture knowledge into a
multiplicity of points of view is parallel to the scientific
community's division into disciplines, which has fractured
science into non- judgmental analysis. Feminism is the fear
of absolute judgment and thus accountability carried to an
extreme. While condemning men for their unwillingness to
accept their responsibility for the world by acknowledging
their male point of view an excellent criticism the
feminists themselves do not accept the accountability of
women for what has come to be .
These feminists have accepted psychology without doubting it,
and that is because it pulls the self away from controllable
areas and contributes to the fracturing of identity. If
there is a biological or psychological reason
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for actions, then blame can be shifted from free will. They
accept the notion of the phallic symbol, for example, without
questioning it, and only because it represents women's
general blamelessness for the course of history. If the
world is seen as the creation by males of a ravaged
countryside of phallic structures (instead of, as one four-
year-old sees it, a land of people symbols, or cities built
with domed breasts and many-wombed buildings) , then women are
not to blame for their own participation. Women have
participated in and enjoyed such phenomena as the
fetishization of woman. Women who bleach their hair or apply
fingernail polish indulge in a daily regimen of becoming the
standardized woman. I hope to make myself a part of a long
tradition of autonomous selves who did not, could not,
believe what was expected of them, and consequently refused
to participate: among them Socrates, Rembrandt, Salman
Rushdie, Martin Luther King, Jr., Gandhi, Emily Dickinson,
Eleanor Roosevelt, Albert Einstein, Abraham Lincoln. I do
not class myself with those women who embraced their
position, accepted unquestioningly what they liked to think
of as their lot, or considered themselves victims of a
patriarchal society in which they were the recipients of
luxury.
Any thinker has considered himself both from his point
of view and from without, and has considered the world from
his point of view and from without . Any thinker has taken
the risk of associating himself with his work. Any
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trespasses on this accountability are made by institutions,
and institutions, like marriage, are made up of women as well
as men. Women gave orders to slaves in our country, and for
that, I would rather not associate myself with a particularly
female suffering. Women have hoarded the knowledge learned
from child rearing, and then denied the very existence of
that knowledge. Radical feminists accuse liberal feminists
of becoming just like men, but women have always been just
like men, both participating equally in a division of labor
between classes and sexes. The real discrimination has been
against all people who are denied equal participation in
child rearing, equal control over politics, equal influence
on business, and equal judgment over what life is and should
be. The hierarchy that feminists condemn the pursuit of
truth, knowledge, and the one has long since disappeared.
Scientists pursue detailed knowledge of details, art has
become constricted to the attempt to do what has not been
done before the quest, in short, for a saleable gimmick
and philosophy has become a quibbling over logic. "The signs
of that constriction are everywhere today in the small
ambitions of art, in its lack of any effort towards
spirituality, in its sense of career rather than vocation, in
its frequently bland occupation with semantics at the expense
1 7
of the deeper passions of the creative
self."-1-
Women have not demanded enough of themselves as humans and as
artists, and they have not required anything of men.
Rewriting art history will not change that. Men's fault has
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been the same, except they require nothing of women. Like
Penelope, weaving her tapestry by day, and unraveling it by
night, women have traditionally been enslaved to the
repetitious tasks of everyday life, while the men have led
lives of adventure and pursuits of immortality. The food
that women prepare is eaten, the dishes are washed and used
again. The tasks that form the backdrop for nobler pursuits
are satisfying, but ultimately forgotten. Without them there
would be no science, philosophy, or art, and yet they are the
forgotten arts. Women do not realize that their history is
inextricable from men's. Women participated.
Simone de Beavoir describes the menstrual cycle as
1 Q
building a cradle each month, only to tear it down
again.0
By the time women have joined the work force as equals, it is
too late. Stunned, women find that men's positions also
consist of the circular routine of the everyday- Men go to
work to make money to buy cars to drive to work in massive
traffic jams. They go to school to get jobs and go to school
to keep their jobs. Their jobs are about products or about
money. They watch television about products and money, and
spend their money, which they earned by advertising products,
on the products they see advertised, and the products cost
more because of the price of advertising and packaging, so
they put in a few more hours at work to break even. There
are no jobs that aren't the same as doing dishes. Women and
men can no longer wage anonymous wars, but should finally
take responsibility for hand to hand combat .
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Step Nine: Ernest Becker's science of man offers an
insightful critique of our time, but his definition of the
self and meaning as created a. posteriori leaves his proposed
solution inadequate.
Although the feminist ideal of responsible and
accountable actions is valuable, their rejection of the
absolute reduces their ideal to just another faction of the
reductionist perception of the self as unable to judge.
Ernest Becker offers a beautifully insightful criticism of
the loss of the power of judgment in the individual. "Homo
sapiens .. .was to lose anything to be really proud of
family and heredity, a feeling of one's place in history, a
coherent and critical world view, most of the special
craftsmanlike skills, an agreed preserve of inner dignity
it all gradually vanished with hiring lines, time-clocked
work, efficiency, and dedication to production and profit.
"*
In 1968, before recent feminists' critique of knowledge and
science, Becker traces a long history of the criticism of
science, including the Abbe de Saint-Pierre's attack on
science divorced from human affairs, Diderot's call for a
science centered on man, Kant's idea of a morality made by
man, Rousseau's criticism of blindly following science. The
Enlightenment criticism, that "science had become a fad. . . It
promised automation
advance,"2 still holds true now. Saint-
Simon, too, criticized scientists who conducted experiments
without regard for the consequences . Comte intended to
synthesize morality and science, thinking that science could
be applied to all human problems and, with progress as the
goal, solve them "by extending rational, scientific analysis
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into all domains human and social, as well as physical and
natural .
" To reverse the hierarchy and put man at the top
of scientific inquiry, the sciences would enable progress
toward the betterment of man, "a thoroughgoing empiricism in
the service of human values, a mature and controlled idealism
of the most realistic kind."4
Becker discusses the problems of body and mind, and man
and society. He credits James Mark Baldwin with solving the
mind and body issue by showing how "the purely symbolic level
of human activity grows out of the purely organic level of
animal activity." Thus individual consciousness is two-fold
organismic and cognitive. Dualism develops as the child
becomes aware of inner thoughts against the outer world.
constantly having to adjust his memory of the outer world
makes him recognize the separateness of his thoughts from the
world. "For the symbolic animal /the self_7 achieves the
highest value, and even the body which opposes it as an
object can be sacrificed for the sake of the values it has
learned."6 Like Dewey, Baldwin saw aesthetic experience as
thought meeting a problem and becoming united with the world,
"the unity that is forged in successful, adaptational
action."7 Baldwin's equation, according to Becker, was
"individual development = the synthesis of inner thoughts and
outer acts = unity = satisfactory experience for the uniquely
symbolic animal = individuation of the most complete kind in
nature."8 Dewey's aesthetic theory, as we have seen,
"consigned man to his full fate as an organism within
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nature .
""
Marx's idea of alienation, Becker continues, consisted
of a person objectifying itself in relation to symbols
instead of objects. He saw that the assembly-line and wage
labor made him a stranger in a world in which he should be
creatively involved. The worker loses the sense of
community, self, and responsibility for products and actions.
since man is an open creature, not fixed, he is formed by
society, which then takes on its own character. Kant thought
that only by aiming, paradoxically, for "maximum
individuality within maximum community,"10 could alienation
be overcome .
Becker's most brilliant observations are on the ethical
values of aesthetics. He cites Ortega Y Gasset, Cassirer,
Max Scheler, and Georg Simmel in his discussion of man as
Homo Poeta, creator of meaning. (The best part about Becker
is his ability to acknowledge his debt to earlier thinkers,
and to synthesize their thoughts in his own wisdom.) Since
man is not instinctualjygrounded in the world, Becker
explains, because he develops a self by interacting with the
world, he is continually creating reality. The cycle of the
everyday is not enough to sustain his interest, and so, to
render reality meaningful, man creates meaning. This
creation of meaning, although playful, "is deadly earnest,
because without this artificiality, man has no distinctive
world. . . When man loses the conviction of his everyday social
performance, his basic and elemental life meaning grinds to a
halt."11 This idea recalls Kant's idea of the usefulness of
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positing a higher reality, although there are no rational
grounds to do so .
Art work, according to Becker, represents possessing the
world by infusing it with meaning, the aesthetic object is
the most convincing form of the fabrication of meaning. Men
need the freedom to create new meaning, or their lives are
meaningless, and furthermore, they must believe that their
creations are real. Becker concludes that the best support
for man's convictions is the human community- Ritual gives
aesthetic meaning to the world. "To stage the dream, then,
is to create life, because one creates more visible nature;
to 'live the dream' is to partake of the richer life that one
has staged."12 If man doesn't stage the world, it is not
his, and he is not much more than an animal, because the
world itself is neutral. Becker points out that shared
culture enables people to create their sense of value, and
the individual with different ideas is a threat. "Primitives
managed, for the most part, to allow the individual the
relative freedom to celebrate his energies in a rich present,
and they managed to combine this celebration with a strict
code of social
mutuality-"13 Modern industrial man has lost
ritual, and thus the celebration of himself as he moves
through life.
Now, Becker adds, there is a loss of dignity, shown in
the pervasive fear of death, and the fetishization of woman
as love object, because the individual doesn't participate in
the world in a self-reliant way. He considers life
"overwhelming, precarious, even
unfair."
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Prior to the feminists, then, Becker has pointed out the
loss of responsibility for one's actions, the value
neutrality of the scientific method, the failure to consider
the experimenter's intentions as part of scientific inquiry,
the fragmentation of science into disciplines, and the
fetishization of woman. For Becker, studying objects in
isolation loses sight of the importance of their
interrelationships. Becker sees values as emergent,
dependent on knowledge . He combines Dewey' s idea of
knowledge through scientific inquiry, and the feminist ideal
of knowledge through dialogue. He suggests that as
scientific experimentation with man as the center expands
into all areas of life, values will tend to standardize and
universalize, as "certain values are inseparable from certain
given
situations." 5 Like Kant, Becker suggests that the
human mind works in a certain standard way. Socialism is
inevitable, he continues, because the scientific approach to
economics dictates it. He combines intrinsic and
instrumental values in his idea that values are created in
action, but "that there is a mandate in the human spirit for
the kind of values we should
further."16 He decides that
"uniform institutional arrangements that respond to
intellectual, critical control are the only way of
guaranteeing a multiplicity of personal
values."17
Becker defines the good as what liberates man from
automaticity and allows freedom. The science of man, the
merger of science, philosophy, and religion, would enable
choices to be under free, human control. Like the feminists,
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he calls for "a tentativeness in both ethics and science...
it would go beyond all absolutisms toward a true human
freedom... it would be tentative and transactional."18
Because Becker' s views are close to my own, I must point
out where we part company. First, Becker calls for a science
in charge of establishing a firm society in which the
aesthetic whole can be pursued, while he gives art the
highest function of man, that is the creation of meaning.
Secondly, for Becker, the child gains his identity from
society, and the individual later clashes with society in his
efforts to create meaning.
Becker calls for a science in charge of society, with
the progress of man as its goal. The highest function of man
within that society is the creation of meaning through art .
Here he overcredits science with the ability to cause
man' s
progress, and he overcredits art as the highest way of
creating meaning. If art is creation of meaning, then there
is no satisfactory cause for the belief in the created
meaning. If we consciously build up meaning in which to act
out our lives, as Becker says, then there is no actual
meaning built. It is, as he points out, a play meaning, a
cultural ritual to perpetuate our participation in the farce.
Furthermore, he places science in an ethical role, as the
support of art. Science is not a field of knowledge, but a
field of inquiry. It, like art, represents the quest for
meaning.
The freedom in society to create meaning would be the
same as the freedom to create meaning through science. he
assumes that science can be used to better man's condition.
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Science is not capable of this betterment, and neither is
art. Science, art, work, games, math, thought, and dialogue
are the methods for pursuing meaning. If we give these
disciplinesthe task of creating meaning, then we deny any real
purpose in them. That is, it is impossible to pursue meaning
if we are the makers of it. The feminists and Becker, in
praising point of view, strip the world of real meaning. In
order to aestheticize everyday life, we must take science out
of it as a governing entity, and relegate it to its true
position as one of the methods for pursuit of meaning. The
aestheticization of everyday life can never be a substitute
for meaning, but it can enrich the cultural backdrop of the
pursuit of meaning.
For Becker, the individual gains its identity from
society, but later clashes with it . Becker describes the
despair, fear, and guilt an artist feels after creating a
work of art as the result of creating unique meaning, "for
which the singular person afterward feels helpless and
He attributes this unsupported feeling to
"the fact that one's insides . . .are never wholly one's own."20
If a self derives its values from its culture, and
builds upon those values, reacting with them, in order to
reach full individuation, than there is some identity in the
self separate from society that enables it to be contrary to
the very society that reared it. The ability to doubt at
least must be prior to the education of the infant in order
for it later to turn against society in its own quest for
freedom. Becker's assertion that society can provide meaning
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for the individual is misguided, because a constructed
meaning is not an acceptable substitution for found meaning.
As we have seen, a fabricated meaning, like a fabricated
self, does not justify behavior that consists in searching
for answers to new questions. While it is true that a social
structure that enable freedom of thought and development of
an aesthetic whole is an ideal, it is not a substitute for
the quest for meaning.
Becker' s definition of art as created meaning is also at
fault because art, like science, usually results in more
questions. An artist is often questioning the possibilities
of knowledge, as Vitz and Glimcher have shown in their
analysis of the questioning of vision. As Einstein puts it,
"One does the best service by giving them some elevating work
to do and thus indirectly elevating them. This applies most
of all to the great artist, but also in a lesser degree to
9 1
the scientist."^
Becker's mistake, like that of the feminists, is in
denying the existence of absolutes, and hence the
universality of the self. He speaks of the self as an a.
posteriori product of culture, and then laments the loss of
faith in the ability of the individual to form meaning. If
he is a product of culture, the most he can do is perpetuate
culture in some way. How can he trust his judgment more than
that of society? Becker does not distinguish between art and
craft. Craft could be seen as the forming of a meaningful
aesthetic culture. Art, as one of the inquiries of
knowledge, has less to do with aesthetics.
Becker's description of alienation, for example, makes
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true sense only if the individual is a universe in himself.
Becker, like the feminists, preaches tolerance, but tolerance
implies a tendency to be intolerant. The reason for this
intolerance, as Becker has described, is an attempt to keep
whatever meaning a closed culture can offer. Real tolerance,
however, does not lie in insisting that everyone' s vision is
limited, as the feminists do in stressing the absence of
objective knowledge, and as Becker does by giving man the
ability to create meaning, but rather in admitting that each
man is a universe unto himself. In order to expand his
knowledge, then, each man must interact with the other
objectively knowing selves, and must interact with all forms
of knowledge discovered and undiscovered.
Becker also denies the possibility of absolute knowledge
outside of the self. He sees the empirical world as material
for man's creation of meaning. He sees the beautiful as the
union of the good and the true in other words, art is the
creation of meaning according to a morality in which human
betterment is the center of all science. His morality is
utilitarian, after all, and as it does serve man is very
eloquent. Unfortunately, in defining the aesthetic whole as
a product of man, instead of as a discovery of man, he makes
man's interaction with the world a voluntary mastering of it,
instead of a necessary inquiring into it. It's possible that
my goals for society are the same as his
in practice, but my
plan for the individual is more far-reaching.
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Step Ten: The specific is universal and the aesthetic whole
is a spiritual goal.
I would like to pause and define the term "aesthetic",
but I find that I can' t . It is a word that has been much
bandied about, to include art, to exclude art, to include
nature, craft, emotion, to exclude them. I find it
sufficient to say that aesthetics are the study of beauty and
leave it at that . Then perhaps I should pause and define
beauty, as long as I have paused. There are thousands of
ways to define it. The abundance of writing on the subject
reveals not only differing definitions, but also differing
views of which objects are actually beautiful. It turns out
that it is not important to define beauty either, but instead
to explain its ability to crop up in the most unlikely
places, often accompanied by its intimate friend ugliness.
Not only do people disagree, one insisting an object is
beautiful while the other finds it ugly, but a person will
also disagree among himself. He will at one time find
something beautiful, and later call it ugly, or he will go so
far as to say that it is beautiful because it's ugly! He may
be trying to be facetious, but he looks so earnest. It may
be that he is acknowledging the complexity of judgments of
value .
These judgments are complicated because they involve
assessing both the object's possession of qualities, and the
tastes of the viewer. Let us not disparage the value of
taste in making judgments. We are born with certain a. priori
faculties: to sense, to recognize patterns, and to prefer.
These three faculties are the three required in making
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aesthetic judgments. One perceives through his senses,
discriminates between the things he perceives, and chooses
among them according to his tastes. One's tastes form one's
whole identity, and are specific to the individual.
The study of children proves the existence of these a
priori tastes. Infants are born with a set of potential
abilities existing in the layout of the brain, and the desire
to put these to use. These abilities are rendered specific
to the individual by the existence of a completely formed
character. The character of the infant determines, among
other things, the extent to which his environment will affect
him and his responses to his environment. Babies maintain
pure thought before birth, as dream studies have shown, and
are born still engaged in thought, but now accompanied by
bodies that form a link with the outside world. The infant
mind contains degrees of taste for movement, creation, and
expression. Curiosity, for example, is a taste for learning,
and doubt is a taste for autonomy.
Studies on the abilities of newborns have shown that the
mind of the infant contains much of the groundwork for future
actions. The baby's senses are fully developed and
functioning,1 and he can distinguish between close stripes
and grey, between straight and curved lines, between rich and
minimal contour, between C and C sharp, between spoken
syllables
"pa"
and
"ba",2 between a plain white field and a
white field containing a bar of very slightly off-white (the
bar of white differs by 5%).3 A
4-month-old' s ability to
discriminate between blue, green, yellow, and red indicates
65
innate hue categorization.4
Newborns' acute sensitivity to frequency change
especially in the frequency range of human speech, is a
prerequisite to their analyzing complex sounds, including
speech, and indicates that "the mechanism underlying future
speech perception may well be innate."5 Dr. Spock also
refers to this ability to recognize speech patterns in
pointing out the newborn's ability to understand not words,
but tone of voice. The newborn shows preference for gentle,
low speech. One 6-week-old repeatedly showed a decided
preference for a hummed F-C-A progression by smiling.7
Each infant has a wholly formed system of tastes
extending from how he prefers to be held to what patterns
catch his eye. Possession of an a. priori individual system
of tastes is universal . So we find that what is completely
specific is universal. Specificity is not opposite to
universality, but an integral part of it. At birth we have
complete contact with our specific tastes, but they get
clouded over by learning. They also must confront ever more
complicated choices .
The specific system of preferences includes the body and
its relationship to the world. Mind is only the same as body
because everything received by the mind passes through the
senses. The only thing we can know, from birth onward, is
our reaction to what we perceive, and this reaction is based
solely on taste. Our original tastes are prior to body, and
remain intact, but respond to all perceptions and
discriminate between what we accept as knowledge, and what we
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reject .
The main tenet of aesthetic philosophy has been either
that there is absolute aesthetic value, or that the aesthetic
value is subjective. This is the same division we have seen
between all opposites hot and cold, alive and dead, left
and right, black and white, right and wrong, beautiful and
ugly, body and mind, process and product, zero and infinity.
Opposites do not exist, even as a construction of the human
mind. The opposite is always accompanied by its opposite in
the mind. Not only do we suspect and fear that the opposite
may be true whenever we suggest an idea, but we also can't
attempt to find a dividing line between any two opposites.
Hot and cold, for example, become warm between them, but by
degrees. Any distinction determining at which temperature
cold becomes warm would be arbitrary.
The physiological explanation for heat sensation is that
the sensors for cold and warmth in human skin are two
separate types of nerve receptor. Cold receptors respond to
temperatures below body temperature. The stimulus for both
is the same, that is, heat, "since temperature itself is only
an expression of the relative amount of this energy
present."8 Apparently, then, the division between warm and
cold would be roughly 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit for humans.
However, an experiment on false sensations shows that heat
sensation is arbitrary. The left hand is soaked in hot water
and the right in cold water for a few minutes. Then both
hands are immersed in tepid water. The left hand feels the
tepid water as cold, and the right hand feels it as hot.
In
the middle of the experiment, moreover, when the
hands are in
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the hot and cold water, adaptation occurs. That is, the
hands become used to the temperature of the water, and no
longer react to it as hot or cold. In everyday experience,
we see this adaptation to experience at the swimming pool,
where people always insist, "The water's warm once you get
in." We also see adaptation in our reactions t0 the same
temperature in different seasons. In winter, when the
temperature rises to 40 degrees, everyone goes outside with
no coat, but in summer, when the temperature drops to 4 0
degrees, everyone puts on his jacket.
Even the sensation of hot and cold is the same one. We
withdraw the affected hand suddenly, and a drawn-in breath
becomes a sigh of relief if we are merely chilled, not
burned. The physiological explanation for this reaction is
simple. Extreme temperatures are not experienced by the warm
and cold receptors alone. "At very hot or cold temperatures
the skin loses its acute sensitivity... Evidently, the
sensation of extreme heat is due partly to temperature and
partly to
pain."^ Hot and cold, then, are not opposites but
varieties of reaction to heat. No wonder Socrates did not
trust information gained through the senses.
Zero and infinity are likewise difficult to accept as
opposites. Created to explain, on the one hand,
nothingness, and on the other hand, eternity, they explain
nothing. It is as difficult to fathom absence as eternal
presence. In fact, space, the infinite zero, is the most
difficult thing to comprehend. If something can be both
nothing and forever, then infinity and zero are not opposite.
There are also gradations of specificity and
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universality, but when something is completely specific, then
it is also completely universal. Because the self is by
nature composed of absolutely specific attributes, we sense
the presence of the absolute and the specific and assume
their separateness . Emotions seem to refer to specific
events and sensations, while reason appears able to transcend
the everyday and arrive at general conclusions. Reason
refers no more only to the absolute than emotions refer only
to the specific. It is in art that we find the unity of
reason and emotions, and it is in art also that we find the
portrayal of the absolute and the specific. Perception of
the absolutely specific, not in representational terms, but
in the life of the picture itself, evokes those Kantian
rational emotions that correspond to our own rationally
feeling would. Like a self, the painting has its own
objective truth, but the objective truth lies in its specific
identity as its own self, the only one of itself, the
absolutely specific self, which must be taken on its own
terms because there are no terms other than itself which can
explain it. Like a self, it evades all classification save
the class of itself. It has absolute specificity it has,
for want of a better term, a soul.
This absolute specificity can be termed aesthetic
wholeness. The artist does not consciously make art. The
artist paints what pops into his mind. Even the well-planned
painting begins with an idea that finds itself in the
artist's mind. It is the absolute in the specific of the
artist's soul that inspires the artist with ideas, and it is
the specific in the absolute that dictates their execution.
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Step Eleven: The aesthetic whole is also a moral imperative.
All life is taken on aesthetic terms . There is no
morality that is not defined by aesthetic values, and
likewise there is no art without a sort of morality- The
very term
"value" is an aesthetic idea. The idea that one
thing is worth more than another is a matter of taste. Any
system of morality is based on taste. We have seen that
taste is specific to each self and is a. priori . Each taste
is a special form of ugliness, being limited. This
specifically formed system of uglinesses composes a
particular beauty. This beauty is one of a kind it is the
soul. It is beauty composed of ugliness. The tastes are
ugly because they prevent us from seeing objects for what
they are. Even as social roles are ugly because they impose
artificial limits, tastes blind us to the beauty in other
objects. But combined they are beautiful because they give
us a particular identity and beauty so particular as to be a
universal entity. Without this combination of uglinesses, we
would be unable to comprehend the other. Since there is no
class to describe each particular beauty, each beauty is a
class in itself. Each taste is also a form of chaos, because
it causes apparently wanton choices, but all of the tastes
together form order, because they determine an entire way of
thinking, complete in itself.
There is a common ground for all taste systems, and that
is that if we abandon the idea of morality, and address
issues in terms of their contribution to the aesthetic whole,
then we can find a code of actions. The soul is absolutely
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specific, and must acknowledge the absolutely specific nature
of all souls. In order to achieve the aesthetic wholeness of
our life, we must attempt to know our soul, but in order to
know our soul, we must pursue aesthetic wholeness. Because
of the absolute specificity we share with all other souls,
aesthetic wholeness for each self depends on aesthetic
wholeness of all other selves. Unlike the bleeding heart
liberal who must donate a certain amount of money to
charities to ease the pain of conscience that accompanies his
wealth, each soul is truly responsible for the aesthetic
wholeness of his others. That pain of conscience is not
actually a moral twinge, it is an aesthetic one. He finds
poverty distasteful, and so finds it distasteful to enjoy his
apparent aesthetic pleasures while others suffer. Since
there is a blot on his aesthetic outlook, he tries to clear
his conscience by donating money. What he does not realize
is that, in order to achieve any sort of aesthetic pleasure,
he must pursue his soul. Because he fails to do that, he
pursues aesthetic ends instead. These can never form an
aesthetic whole without the understanding of his soul. The
objects are not enough to be tasteful, because they allow the
idea of the opposite to enter that is, the idea of the
have-not. Any time the opposite enters as an opposite, it
enters as an opponent. If, on the other hand, an opposite is
taken as part of its opposite, it becomes part of the path to
discovery of the self, or soul. If he has, but has not,
simultaneously and not exclusive of each other,
then he
catches a glimpse of his absolute specificity. So instead of
donating money while enjoying his luxury, the bleeding heart
71
liberal would be better off embracing poverty' s own beauty,
and taking it on simultaneous with his own wealth. In other
words, he will be in direct contact with poverty, and what he
must do in order to achieve his aesthetic wholeness will
become manifest .
It becomes clear that the aesthetic wholeness of the one
is directly dependent on the aesthetic wholeness of all. Our
own specificity, which is also the part of us that is
absolute, is the starting and ending point of all humor.
Humor elevates us above our situation, as so many have said,
but only by planting us in our place much more firmly. The
ability to be outside ourselves is the very same as the
ability to be inside ourselves. Because our self is
absolutely specific, we are always both inside and outside of
ourself . We can never picture what it must be like to be
someone else, nor can we picture what it is like to be
ourself, but we can always visualize the completeness of the
other self, because our self has the capacity for
completeness. Because we could never be the other self,
being so specific in our own identity, we could just as
easily be the other self, it being so specific also. All
selves share in this absurd specificity. We are responsible
for others finding their aesthetic whole because we are
dependent on them to give us ours.
The artist may desire self-exile, but he is also
dependent on the audience. More than being dependent on the
audience for a listening ear, he is dependent on them because
he wants to contribute to their aesthetic wholeness.
He is
attempting to give of his own specificity
in order that they
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may enrich theirs. He is dependent on them and responsible
to them. He desires to participate in the aesthetic
wholeness of the whole aesthetic being, and more than this,
desires the participation of all the others. The only way
for the artist himself to pursue his soul is through the
participation of everyone in their own pursuit of soul.
The only morality necessary is living for the aesthetic
whole, because in order to live aesthetically, one must not
only be responsible for one's actions, but also know what the
actions are. One must do his own actions, not let them be
done for him by someone else. A scientifically controlled
society that provides a comfortable setting for its citizens
is not good enough, because it obscures the actions of its
citizens. Packaged meat, for example, does not vaguely
resemble the killing required to produce it. Electric lights
do not have anything to do with oil or nuclear waste. It is
not whether each matter is right or wrong that is important,
but that each agent knows exactly what has occurred. People
need to know their actions, come to grips with meaning, fight
life head on, "meet your accusers face to face in the
rain,"1 before they can begin to know themselves.
Nothing should make an artist sadder than war, the
simultaneous violation of the respect for the wholeness of
each person, and denial of the meaning of actions. In art we
learn that chaos and dissonance are productive, because in
art they strengthen the bond of non-opposites . Chaos and
order are seen to be extremes of the same feeling, not
opposite to each other, but related in their pursuit of
wholeness. In art, chaotic elements demand to be taken for
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what they are, while in war chaos is a means to a planned
order. Taken as the opposite of order, chaos is a means, as
opposed to an end. In art we learn that means and ends are
not opposites, but parts of a never-ending process. Ends are
means to another end. When chaos is not seen as an aesthetic
end in itself, it loses its value as a means in forming an
aesthetic whole. Necessarily, because I am not opposite to
you, I must not only respect, but also engage in, your
pursuit of understanding of your soul.
The world of children also requires the balance of order
and chaos. Learning a language requires the concepts of
order and creativity. The ability to learn language is
innate, as is shown in the case of an isolated child who
quickly learned a language despite having been deprived of
continued exposure to it at early stages. Jerrold Katz and
Noam Chomsky argue that the empirical evidence alone does not
provide sufficient information to construct a language
system. The impoverished data available to the child,
consisting mainly of sentences that break rules, is not
enough to create a sense of the structure of language from
nothing.
Chomsky uses the abstractness of the principles
underlying the interpretation of sentences and the universal
character of linguistic structure in his proof. The most
important aspect of language, however, is the creativity
involved in sentence building. The child "is capable of
pairing semantic and phonetic interpretations over an
indefinite range of sentences to which he has never been
exposed. Thus his knowledge extends far beyond his
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experience and is not a 'generalization' from experience."2
Chomsky emphasizes creativity and the infinite ways of
organizing words to express ideas. The reason for the
infinite variety of sentences, as with the infinite variety
of chess games, is that each self is absolutely specific.
There is no such thing as good and bad. Morality is an
evil deceiver if ever there was one. The idea that there
must be rules and regulations to force society's members to
give what they would freely give, and do what they would
freely do, were there no laws to bind them to it, is
ludicrous . The idea that an autonomous universal being needs
to be subjected to leaders who know what is good for him is
preposterous .
Studies on the drawings of children have established the
innate existence of order. Like artists, children express a
taste for ordered experience. Chaos is only useful within
the confines of carefully planned routines.
Perhaps most notable about sequence in drawings is the
degree of order and consistency children reveal, even as
young as three, four, or five. At a time when in much of
their other behavior they appear whimsical, irrational,
or easily distracted by the last thing to come along,
their drawings reveal a great deal of order. In a
sense, they proceed according to plan. To me, the
discovery of this orderly sequence is as important as
the finding that young children's language follows
discernible rules, or as exciting as Lila Ghent's
finding that young children are very consistent in their
judgments about whether abstract shapes (or their own
designs) are upside down or right-side-up. In all these
cases children's behavior follows an identifiable
principle that can be seen to change with age. So the
apparent disorder in children's behavior its apparent
lack of principles or rules is due to our own
ignorance of the principles they work by.
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Children' s preference for order appears also in their
preference for routine. It is external order that provides
the stability necessary for creative thought. Study of the
infant reinforces the universality of the need also for
freedom. The infant requires affection and stimulation in
order to grow and learn. Psychologists agree that children
who are not given enough affection experience "failure to
thrive," in which they simply cease to grow. That the body
is influenced so immediately by the psychic state of the
child illustrates not only the inseparability of mind and
body, but also a set of preconceived expectations in the
child. If the child acquires a self only in response to his
environment, then he will accept any treatment as normal.
Adorno hits on the complicated nature of things in his
discussion of the interaction of opposites: "art is and is
not being-for-itself ,
" ^ but he keeps the idea of a logical
progression of events following a universal order. His
mistake is in preserving the idea that opposites are really
opposite. We can accept the idea of soul without separating
it from body. Plato makes the same mistake when he describes
the sensed world as reflecting the Forms. Although Plato
considers reflecting the Form to be a diminishing of the
object's status, we could consider the relationship of Form
and object to be mutual. The Form derives its concrete
identity from the body even as the body derives its essence
from the Form. Neither stands on its own.
Kant, in his discussion of epistemology, likewise points
out that experience is not possible without the concepts of
our mind to synthesize our perceptions into an order. In
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other words, the world of sense is given identity by being
experienced.5 The mind depends on the empirical for data,
but the empirical depends on the mind to become experience.
Kant also points out that reason desires the existence of
noumena, although noumena' s existence can't be proven.
Einstein describes the interdependence of soul and
experience when he maintains that "cosmic religious feeling
is the strongest and noblest incitement to scientific
research." 6 Although a stable community is necessary for
development of individuals, it is crucial, for Einstein, that
the individual not be subjugated to society. "Creative,
independently thinking and judging personalities" who
enable the growth of society, need freedom for the creativity
that in turn enriches society.
Studies on children deprived of freedom show that the
Q
selfhood of children is limited by restrictions. Children
require and choose order, but are stifled by too many rules.
The reason for this requirement of an unrestrictive order is
that the specific tastes of each self need both autonomy and
the autonomy of others in order to form independent
judgments .
Dr. Spock emphasizes the responsibility of the parents
to establish a secure foundation for the child, but not by
protecting the child. Rather, he recommends letting the
child cry a little over small things so that the child will
know that small things are not disasters. In other words, he
suggests that the child's autonomy will prevail. He mentions
that it is difficult to learn to inhabit a body, and always
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reiterates the necessity of allowing the baby room to
establish his own secure selfhood. Left to their own
devices, left to act according to their own tastes, people
would choose not hedonistic pleasures, but feelingly rational
paths leading to a tasteful life.
There is no need for laws or censorship.
Everything may be spoken or done, because if people are left
to autonomy, they will soon discover that the only
universally tasteful choice is the pursuit of an
aesthetically whole environment where the aesthetically whole
self can thrive and pursue these non-opposite ends. Though
we may say someone has a taste for violence, we discount this
objection on two grounds. First, since violence and peace
are not opposite, but poles on the outer ends of a gradation,
we all have a taste for violence in some degree. Second,
violence that damages a part of the aesthetic whole damages
the self that has a taste for it too, and the desire for an
aesthetic whole does not allow that. We might say someone
has a taste for fragments instead of whole, but, again,
fragments are not opposite to a whole, but parts of it, and
the intact whole is necessary for appreciation of
fragmentation. Consequently, it is only through art that we
can appreciate opposites and begin to understand their
gradual nature.
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Step Twelve: Individual judgment is necessary for pursuit of
an aesthetic whole.
Objects will be pursued in themselves, and work will be
done for itself in an aesthetic environment. Things will be
made to be specific, and in that sense absolute. Mass
production is no longer productive for the true aesthetic
appreciation of everyday life. People's very particular
tastes need to be acknowledged. Until now, we have striven
for a general happiness, based on general tastes. In order
to improve the quality of life, we need to make objects
universal in their particularity. When we share in the
generalization of experience we lose identity, but when we
indulge in the specific quality of our choices, then we
become one with the universal.
There is no such thing as perfection. As we have seen
in studying children, we are what we are from the start and
can never be different. The only absolute Form is
specificity. Instead of pursuing perfection, one pursues
knowledge of the world, and through it oneself. This is a
lifelong pursuit. Knowing what we are is as vague and
elusive a goal as perfection itself. The quest is the goal,
in the sense that it must be accepted that arriving at the
goal is impossible. The pursuit of the soul-self, and of the
aesthetic wholeness of experience is not merely a means to an
end, but an end in itself. Even as the
process of art is the
same as the product, and neither can be without the other,
whether the product is actualized or not, so pursuit of the
goal is the same as the goal. Aesthetic wholeness is
achieved merely by being sought . The soul is found,
though
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it remains elusive.
Humor, love, and art draw the viewer out of himself and
remind him of his smallness in comparison to the cosmos, but
they also focus on the particular. Seeing oneself from
without gives one the point of view of the other, and thus
enables imagination of the specificity of the other. Contact
with another soul enables growth. Because our tastes are
absolute, they also include their opposites. The gradation
of subtlety between opposites begins to dominate and
fluctuate as it is fueled with perceptions.
Not respecting the wholeness of the other person shuts
us off from the layering of selves that enables aesthetic
understanding. That is why it is impossible to be a member
of a jury. Although it may be possible to be a witness, it
is never possible to know the whole story. It is not because
we can see each person's point of view, but because we can't.
We can only know that each person's self is absolute. Kant's
categorical imperative renders action impossible, but respect
for the autonomy of the individual creates an interdependence
that requires certain responsible actions. There can be no
whole without every self. Objective knowledge of the world
is also possible, but there is always something outside of
the self that is not yet known. Analytic science has been
helpful in illustrating this, since no matter how small a
discovery is, there is always a smaller one waiting in the
wings .
The aesthetic moment in art does not exist because art
has no responsibility to the aesthetic. In that sense, art
evokes a moral moment because it derives from the sense of
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the absolute. It is this sense of the absolute that enables
us to see our world as based in the aesthetic and thus to
pursue aesthetic means. Sensing this paradox of the
universal through the specific points us to our own soul-
self, and thus to that of others, invoking the only morality
we need, which is not moral but aesthetic.
Children also give off this sense of the absolute.
Evidence that children have a sense of the absolute has been
unearthed in studies of infants. Kagan's studies of
recognition of faces in infants show that babies are more
interested in an unfamiliar face than in a face that is the
average of the prior faces shown. This suggests that infants
are capable of creating an imaginary prototype of all faces
seen, and distinguishing one resembling it from an entirely
new
example.1 Since the infants could extract a prototype
from experience, they can represent abstract qualities
independently from empirical data, and recognize the
abstraction in other forms.
In a further study, babies were played either a pulsing
or a continuous tone, and then were shown both a broken and a
continuous line. They looked longer at the broken line after
they had heard the pulsing tone, and looked longer at the
continuous line after they had heard the continuous tone.
The ability of babies lacking language to extract absolute
properties like continuity and discontinuity from experience
p
argues in favor of the existence of universals .
Other perceptual contrasts indicate awareness of
universal categories. Two-year-olds say "all
gone"
or "bye
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bye"
upon an object's disappearance and one-year-olds have
gestures that mean the same things, implying an understanding
of absence and presence.
Kagan also finds standards of behavior present in
children's behavior. Two-year-olds from diverse cultural
settings became distressed when a woman approached toys and
acted out difficult routines. "I believe that the child
invents an obligation to duplicate the adult's actions, and,
additionally, knows that she is unable to do so."4 The
imitative powers of babies as young as 4 or 5 months show a
will to practice behaving as the people around them do.
Similarly, children smile spontaneously after completing
difficult tasks . That they do not seek approval indicates
that they derive private satisfaction for meeting standards
set for themselves . 5
These self-imposed standards in children reflect the
notion of absolute preferences of behavior. Similarly,
absolute standards of moral preference appear. Spock
mentions the child's capacity for empathy. A study of
children playing with broken toys indicated that children
responded only to deviations that might have been produced by
actions classified by the child as bad. Extra features did
not cause concern, but broken objects elicited comments like
"oh-oh"
or "broke". Both American and Mayan Indian two-year-
olds look longer at a picture of a face with distorted
features and express concern. The two-year-old considers
actions that hurt somebody or something violations of
standards . 6
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As in Socrates' theory of recollection, these absolute
standards appear to lie dormant in the child and are revealed
by experience as troublesome points. At age three, many
children develop a perfectionist streak in which, despite
encouragement, they insist that their work is not good
enough. The child's immature brain appears to have
difficulty containing some of the concepts expressed by its
more eternal mind. The knitted brow of worry is among the
commonest expressions of the young child. He appears to be
trying to reconcile his own preconceived notions with
experience. His constant questioning of his environment is
like that of a scientist. His memory, as in the case of one
three-year-old who commented, on hearing an undetailed
mention of infants before birth, "I was folded in a glass of
water," does not seem to fit with experience.7 Ideas of the
absolute seem to be drawn from memory and imposed on
experience .
The specific identity of the child also seems to be
forged from the beginning. Spock implies that a human nature
exists and is present in children when he speaks of what
infants expect 8 and the motives of infants. Others agree
that the structure of human thinking is innate. Like Kant,
who described categories in the mind that enable synthesis of
experience, some have found systems of thought and
development that proceed in children regardless of culture
and infant . Although an infant with precocious hand skills
will practice his skill on a wider variety of objects, when
the less precocious child does acquire hand skills,
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individual variation is reduced, illustrating that basic
motor skills are probably innate.9
Beyond this human nature, Spock accepts the distinct
character of each infant. He mentions babies who are easy to
startle and babies who are trembly.10 He takes the
responsibility for the child's nature off the parents when he
talks of the unluckiness of having an irritable baby who
cries all the time.11 The parent must allow for the child's
own specific temperament in caring for him. There is no
authority on child care. Dr. Spock' s success lies in his
insistence that the parent do what feels right. Kopp and
Kagan also support the existence of an innate specific
character in infants. They mention studies of babies who
began irritable and remained fearful and shy. Jean Arsenian
interpreted varying degrees of distress in children upon
leaving their mothers "as due to the children's
personalities, and not to variations in the security of the
19 .
relationship with the
mother."-1-^ Unlike Kant, whose
principles of the mind were universally human, researchers
indicate that the specific character of the individual mind
dictates a specific method of synthesizing experience within
the broader human outlook. Kagan concludes that "each
child's temperament leads him or her to impose a special
1 3
frame on experience."
Like universals, which turn out to be specific beings,
everyday life is not something to be bypassed in the quest
for something more true. Rather, the values we learn from
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art teach us that everyday life can form a continuous
aesthetically unified experience. Craft may not function as
art, but it has an equally important role in making a richly
layered real surface against which our selves can play out
their search for wholeness. Children's and primitive art are
part of the tapestry against which art is displayed.
Although often more aesthetically charged than art, naive art
is too much a part of the universal, and not enough of the
specific to teach the truths art tries to teach.
Categorizing art and non-art is not a way of judging, but a
way of explaining the importance of non-art in building
continuous aesthetic experience. Art is a reflection of the
search for total aestheticization, but non-art is the
material for that aestheticization. Everyday life can only
be important through objects that are greatly aesthetic, but
not art. Cultures not as technologically advanced as ours,
for example, usually have higher standards for the rich
aesthetic content of their customs and practices, not to
mention their possessions.
Artifice is the tool of art. Craft, photography, film,
history, philosophy, and TV do not use artifice. They
reorder reality without attempting to create persuasive
alternate worlds. Art uses trickery to push the limits of
perception. Monet's insanely large brush strokes somehow
manage to draw the observer into his water lilies and accept
the false world they form on its own terms. Pictures and
sculptures that do not require this acceptance by the viewer
are not art. In order for a soul to have insight into its
own identity, or the identity of the whole, it must be forced
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into the presence of another self, and this can be done
through art as well as through other people. Art's use of
artifice, however, enables the viewer to drop his guard and
experience contact with the other more readily. Because he
has been fooled, in a sense, into confronting the art work on
its own terms, he is susceptible to seeing it for what it is,
all of its paradoxes molten in one specifically universal
identity.
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Step Thirteen: Humor in art reveals the necessity of
artifice .
"The great writer .. .has, like a great comedian, in infallible
sense of timing." (John Gardner)
The best part of the Feminist argument is the
independence of the outside world. When Haraway accredits
nature with a sense of humor, she implies that there is
something knowable outside of the observer, and thus that
there may be an objective reality, although she does not
believe in objective knowledge. She refers to Southwest
American Indian folklore of nature as a trickster. This
simple comment on humor shows the range of feeling that humor
includes. In his book, Taking Laughter Seriously. John
Morreall puts forth a theory of laughter as enjoyment of a
psychological shift . He emphasizes the importance of
suddenness, pleasure, and security in humor. I think he
underestimates the power and magnitude of humor. For
example, Morreall lists some standard funny material:
deformity, ignorance, stupidity, immorality, failure,
misfortune, imposters, mimicry, coincidence, unexpected
repetition, inappropriate juxtaposition, violation of natural
laws, violation of linguistic laws, and shift in
perspective. These items have in common more than simple
incongruity. To return to the American Indian point of view,
these items all unleash alternate possibilities. They also
point out the boundaries and limits of the self. Humor pulls
the mind into the land of infinite possibilities where
that short girl is Johnny Carson, where nature has
deliberately outwitted me yet again, where Alfred E. Neumann
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really is the "sexiest schmuck alive,"3 and then jerks it
back into its particular self. Humor is a cosmic version of
motion sickness, in which the universal self joins its peers
for a moment an then plants itself ever more firmly in its
particular .
Donald Kuspit distinguishes between humor and wit .
Humor transcends both wit and the bourgeois, for it
dialectically integrates them. If wit is a manic,
aggressive attempt to recover from a depressing
regression, humor creates a self strong enough to deal
with the world without denying it or backing down from
it. More subtly, humor generously forgives the world
for being the bad thing it is. Humor conveys gratitude
for life despite recognizing its hardships and
injustices. Yet humor is finally more critical of the
world than wit is, for in turning the tables on the
world, humor never turns against the self; humor is
beyond hurt .
Although he gives the avant-garde credit for attempting to
counterbalance the seriousness of bourgeois culture, he denounces
its sense of humor as mere wit. Avant-garde artists have become a
part of the society they poke fun at, and their boredom is
inescapable. The self's "inward life is in dull earnest,... It
believes in the world more than it believes in itself."5
Kuspit' s description of the warm capacity of humor to forgive
and appreciate the world includes the unifying quality of it. It
integrates opposites by appreciating both bad and good, and
emanates from an integrated self, "a poetic self who is
mathematically clear about the
world."6 It is not necessary
therefore to create one division of humor, which he calls humor,
that is superior to another, which he calls wit. Even in
slapstick and puns it is possible to find that insight into other
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possibilities that marks humor. Kuspit' s own idea of humor, after
all, is "largely verbal,"7 a feature usually connected with wit.
What distinguishes kinds of humor is not genre, but insight. A
better distinction might be between transcendental humor and
entertainment .
Kuspit' s criticism of the avant-garde, whose "sense of self
is insufficient for them to realize that the struggle for
individuation is a major issue of artmaking, "8 and his description
of humor are both insightful. His idea of humor as emanating from
a strong self, and appreciatively forgiving the world, recalls
again the American Indian's appreciative version of the world as
trickster. Humor, like art, is a trickster. Being pulled into
the land of infinite possibilities is being tricked, and there is
nothing funnier or more irritating than being tricked. Real humor
reflects a way of looking at the world. From peek-a-boo to
Rembrandt in a funny hat (is he trying to trick us into thinking
he finally got somebody else to sit for him?), being tricked is
being forced into appreciating the outside world, the infinite
possibilities of it, and our own place in it. Humor, because it
involves artifice, is also embedded in art.
The most important quality of art is artifice. Artifice is
the ability to trick the eye or ear, to fool the mind. Artifice
gives art its mystery. Using a medium separate from life, and yet
a material found in life with its own life, the artist builds a
world, where there was none. This world is entirely believable,
in the sense that the viewer is fooled into reacting to it, and
returning to it. Ironically, the forms of art with the least
resemblance to life and the most internal limits are often most
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persuasively alive. Because the emphasis is taken off the form in
a very traditionally structured form, like the sonnet, the artist
is free to manipulate the medium within the form toward a more
specific product. That is, a portrait, for example, by presenting
a traditional form, is free to inquire more deeply into the
subtleties of expression. Because the artist is not attempting to
introduce a new form, and in this way to jar the audience, he is
free to jar the audience in more important ways, that is, in his
uses of artifice. As Vitz and Glimcher put it, familiar objects
"are superior for their very familiarity accentuates the shock of
strange juxtapositions there is no distraction from trying to
figure out what the object is."9 Sometimes it is necessary to
introduce a new form, but this should be done in such a way as not
to limit the power of artifice.
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Step Fourteen: Judgment of art and craft depends on their
relationship to the aesthetic whole.
The success of traditional forms has to do also with the
relationship of the artist to the history of art. He
acknowledges his debt to the giants on whose shoulders he
stands, without renouncing his aim of transcending their
abilities. The artist does not need to pursue style. If
proper attention is paid to making the object, the style will
follow. The personal touch of the artist will necessarily
penetrate the artwork, and any attempt to cultivate a
signature style results in creating only a gimmick. When one
studies art history, especially recent history, one might
conclude that a trademark style or gimmick is what makes an
artist famous. This is a misinterpretation of art history .
In fact, it is this attempt to find technical variety that
has taken people's minds off the dynamics of the product, and
its relationship to the processes that formed it. It also
reduces the position of the viewer from someone who interacts
with the artwork and continues the process, to a mere
audience for the spectacle of the artist's
conceptualizations .
The study of art history is important for the obvious
reason of learning from the masters . But what do we learn
from them? We learn that it is not necessary to seek fame
and glory, or to come up with a catchy statement or
innovative technique. The despairing artist fears that
"everything has been done". The history of art should
inspire artist with the endless possibilities, not stifle
them with the futility of coming up with any new ideas.
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Rembrandt, for example, teaches self-exploration and humor.
He only broke barriers in his attempt to see things clearly.
He required a new language of expression because he was
himself, and each self has its own creative language. He
didn't seek a new technique as an end in itself. The work of
the artist is studying the depths of medium and form, and
where the old limits are no longer helpful, adjusting them.
Art, like chess, is not limited to finite patterns.
The technique, or manipulation of the medium, is an
important part of the process of making the product.
Technique allows the medium to speak. The medium controls
the technique to a certain extent. Its own characteristics
add an element of luck. For example, the grain affects a
woodcut, or a fissure affects a marble sculpture, or natural
opacity affects an oil painting. The painter has to use his
own knowledge, but he also must allow the medium to have its
say. The balance of these is technique. It represents the
artist's participation in the process.
The presence of the work of art is what sort of reaction
it demands. If it involves the viewer, then the viewer's
reaction to the work of art also becomes part of the life of
the work of art . Because each viewer is an absolute self,
the reaction of each will be entirely specific. Furthermore,
because of the development of the self toward aesthetic
wholeness, each viewer's reaction to the work of art will be
different each time he sees it. It is this quality of the
responsiveness of art that requires the involvement of all in
art. The process of discovery and discussion becomes part of
the life of the work of art. An artwork is the reaction of
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the artist to life, and reflects his pursuit of meaning. The
artist, however, is the last to understand his work, because
an artwork can be interpreted in infinite ways and on many
levels. it must be capable of this depth of meaning because
it must be accessible on some level to everyone who sees it.
It may prove to be beautiful to some, and ugly to others, but
it will be memorable. The viewer will return to it often, if
not in person, at least in memory. Each work will, of
course, evoke a deeper response from certain viewers, but
real art works are seen and remembered by all.
As mentioned, the artist does not always understand his
own work. "The spectator will always understand more than
the artist intended, and the artist will always have intended
more than any single spectator
understands."1 This
phenomenon is caused partly by the different frame of
reference of each viewer. As we have seen, the working of
art is the artist feeling, rationally, but blindly, for
meaning in response to his knowledge of the world. The
moment of the loss of the self in the work is, paradoxically,
not only the moment of greatest self-expression, as Pollock
taught us when he denied the accident, but it is also the
moment when the work of art becomes itself. A work of art
interpreted on an infinite variety of levels, like life
itself. Not only dependent on the minds of its audience, the
work of art must also be able to sustain the mood changes of
each viewer. It must be able to have meaning independent of
changes of time and setting. If it requires an explanation
or a specific setting, like a gallery, to transmit meaning,
then it may be visual thought, but not a work of art.
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The recent movement of craft to the gallery setting is a
testament to the lack of aesthetic value in everyday life.
Not only have everyday objects made it into galleries as art,
as in the case of Duchamp's readymades, but craftsmanship has
been relegated to the museum. Instead of enriching the very
material of existence, craft must be visited in the gallery.
Craft does not need to be considered art, because it has an
important function of its own. Art is about life, but craft
has the ability to b_e_ life. Craft is the making of meaning,
while art is merely the search for meaning.
The final proof of a work of art is its autonomy. In
the presence of this autonomy, the viewer feels, not only the
working of the artist, but also the absolute quality of the
work itself. It has its own identity, we feel this, and
perhaps we can know it. It is proof of the existence of
absolutes outside of the human absolute. It is proof, as are
science, math, games, sports that there is always something
beyond humanity, whether or not knowable by us . It is proof
of the infinite maneuvers capable by the human mind. We see
it in chess, that a seemingly limited game is rendered
infinite in possibilities, simply with the addition of the
absolute participants. In sports, painting, music, science,
limits are always broken, and in math new systems are built.
And yet, these things exist outside of us, because there is
always something else that has not yet been found. We feel
its presence around us, even as we sensed it within us: that
mysterious something that is yet to be.
As Pollock put it, "I have an edge dream, off and on.
I'm sort of way out there on my own, moving slowly to the
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edge, but not to a cliff, and it's not a void either... What
it is, what it feels like, is just more me."2 Or, as Bob
Dylan puts it, "I've been wondering all about me, ever since
I've seen you there... I know I'm around, but I don't know
where."0 It is as if these artists are sniffing their own
scent in their quest for meaning in the world outside of
them.
The absolute nature of the self, of the artwork, is not
only known by man. If nobody ever sees it, or recognizes its
status as art, then it still has a place among the absolute
selves that have been.
The way around Plato's problems with the Forms, then,
would be to posit a world of identities, or ideas. All
possibilities are actualized in this world of Forms, but
humans draw intuitively on this world for ideas.
Philosophers can study the absolute in the sensed, and thus
use the felt world as a beginning. Artists also use the felt
world as their impetus, and as a launch for finding the
eternal .
The specificity of the object does not draw from a Form,
but the eternal aspects do derive from Forms. It is the
layering of existence that makes it complex and fascinating.
There is the physical surface, which is short-lived,
embodying decay, age, death, then there is the interactive
level, on which physical beings work with each other, as
family, friends, political conversants, or as cogs in a
machine, or parts of a whole. There does not need to be a
Form of a car, for example, because it is an interactive
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object. Then again, there is a layer of thought regarding
these relationships, or history, which, though long, is not
eternal. Institutions like marriage belong to this layer.
While a marriage takes on a life of its own, it is a life in
thought, not in absolute existence. There is another layer
of possibly infinite, but not absolute, entities: space,
time. Finally is a layer of timelessness, in which we are
aware of the possibilities and impossibilities of mind.
Glimpsing these eternal ideas that exist in themselves, but
pertain also to relationships, gives a sense of
enlightenment, revelation, or awe, but affirms one's
existence in the specific.
Plato's philosophy claims to transcend the layers and
reach enlightenment, but actually incorporates these layers
through dialogue. He uses the physical people as voices in
an interactive inquiry into history, in making a case for
pure thought. Art also uses these layers. Renaissance
painters literally used layers of translucent paint to create
a rich depth reflecting not so much a likeness of the seen
world, but more the complexity of the light . Since there are
five senses and thought, it is never so simple to depict in
two dimensions what is felt in six.
Though philosophy has elements of art in its ability to
present ideas creatively and think outside regular bounds, it
does not allow the bond of trust between artist and observer,
nor the infusion of elements by an outside source. There can
be much discussion and interpretation, but insofar as all the
issues are laid out as plainly as possible, to avoid
misinterpretation, nothing is trusted to the observer's own
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subtle range of interpretation, and nothing unintentionally
allowed. The luck-chance element of art is lacking. In art,
the painter must have faith: in the painting to have unknown
elements, in the medium to be expressive in its own right, in
the observer to add elements not observed by the artist
himself, and in himself to possess a self of value and a
learning judgment .
The most important distinction in judging art, then, is
in determining if a piece of is a work of art. If it
represents someone's labor to inquire into the absolute
within and outside of himself, and has levels of meaning,
humor not necessarily uproarious, but humanly felt
appreciation for the world, technical ability that the artist
constantly studies and attempts to perfect, and presence,
then it is a part of the working of art. We call it an
artwork. Once we determine that an artwork is a true working
of art, then taste determines the viewer's own relationship
to the artwork. Art itself, those workings of art that are
absolute selves, has absolute value, which we can suspect and
argue about, but not know.
104
Step Fifteen: Cuteness is an example of the complicated
intertwining of experience.
In an attempt to tie up the loose ends of this
discussion of humor and the judgment of art, I will respond
to an article on cuteness by John Morreall. Morreall argues
that it is the cuteness of babies that has allowed their
survival. Cute features cause adults to want to care for
babies, and evoke "bonding". Cuteness crosses the boundaries
of taste and endears the baby to all who may be necessary to
its survival. "Bigots will often admit the cuteness of
infants in the group they despise. "1
He also points out that finding babies cute fulfills
needs in adults also, for affection and for pleasant
compensation for all the slave labor adults have to do for
infants. In extending his argument to cuteness in general,
he reminds us of "the connection between cuteness and eating
or nuzzling,"2 and points out, as endearing attributes,
vulnerability and naivete.
Morreall says that cuteness is not appropriate in art
because it is unsubtle, shallow, quick, easy, thoughtless,
automatic, and "requires no taste or aesthetic education to
learn."3 He condemns movies that manipulate the emotions,
preferring a more complicated emotional experience involving
tension and possible resolution. "The human race is lucky to
have its automatic reactions, in short, but those reactions
could never be the stuff of great
art."4
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I agree that there is a distinction between cuteness and
beauty, but I find Morreall' s discussion, especially of
babies, not inquisitive enough. Morreall makes a technical
mistake that I think ought to be corrected. He explains the
lack of cuteness in art this way: "The traditions of Western
fine art have been male dominated, and males have not valued
the tender feelings involved in cuteness... Aesthetic
features eliciting nurturing responses Have not been
considered important by male artists."5 Here he implies four
things: first, that females have a greater disposition to
respond to cuteness; second, that a female dominated art
would find a place for cuteness in it; third, that the
infants portrayed by male artists are not cute; and fourth,
that cuteness is the same as cutif ication . These four things
conflict with his thesis. First, his whole idea is that
everyone responds to cuteness on the same simple lever. To
contend that cuteness triggers only a female response is to
reduce the argument to a mere analysis of maternal instinct.
If Morreall intends such an analysis, then the whole section
on why men call their lovers
"baby" has no place in his
essay.
Second, the implication that a female dominated art
world would find a place for cuteness implies that women
accept superficial cuteness as equaling aesthetic quality or
beauty. Even in the case of children, a mother will prefer
her child, for who he is, over other people's more attractive
children. If cuteness were accepted as the final criterion
in aesthetic appreciation, women would always be trading in
their husbands for plump young things, and their possessions
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for polka-dotted toadstools. A good example of an artist who
treats infants is, after all, Mary Cassatt, whose
straightforward approach to her subject matter is clearly
that of an outside observer. In that sense, her portrayal of
children is as male as Morreall could wish from art, since a
male dominated art is not subject to cuteness.
Third, however, I would hesitate to consider the
role of the outsider to be a masculine role. In painting, we
find also countless babies painted by males, some as if by an
outsider, and some as if by a parent or someone with inside
information on the subject of children. If Morreall says
that babies are cute, then a representational painting of one
would necessarily include at least some cute features.
Furthermore, the babies of Rubens have exaggeratedly cute
features, including extra of the ever-popular rolls of fat
around the thighs. Renoir's portraits of children emphasize
their softness, another of the cute features Morreall
mentions. Rembrandt's Ganymede is peeing. What could be
cuter? And yet, each artist has more to say about children
than that they are merely cute.
Last, I believe Morreall has confused cuteness,
which occurs naturally, with cutification, which is what I
would call a contrived cuteness. Unlike a cute baby, which,
although cute, exists, as we have seen, on other levels as
well, a cutified object has been exaggerated and simplified
so that it exists mostly on a cute level. Something derived
from nature, for example, like a rainbow, that has been
reduced to its simplest form and stamped as a cheaply
accessible symbol of hope, has been cutified. The
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particularity of each rainbow is no longer important, but the
physically obvious features are treated as a symbol. Certain
things, when given a logo or nickname, are also cutified,
because they are reduced to a simplistic level. The township
of Henrietta, for example, posts its logo on welcoming signs.
It does not need a logo, as if it were some kind of business
trying to make itself memorable or legitimize itself. While
things that are cute by nature have a great deal of dignity,
a cutified thing, by the very self-consciousness of its
presentation, is stripped of any specific, and thus
universal, identity, and reduced to a symbol of itself. When
a baby is cutified in illustration, certain features are
exaggerated to emphasize its cuteness alone. This
exaggeration is a concession to the fact that a baby is not
simply cute. Generalization is a way of forming the
equation: child = all children = love. This
oversimplification of a complex relationship strips it of
real emotion, and generates, in its place, schlock.
In pointing out the cute features of babies, Morreall
quotes Konrad Lorenz, who lists large head, large forehead,
low eyes, plump cheeks, short and thick limbs, soft skin,
weakness, clumsiness. What he does not mention are
characteristics that are equally charming, but more difficult
to classify. For example, the way an infant's head extends
in back to hold its massive brain is particularly endearing.
Not the thickness of its arms, but the oddly delicate
thinness of its wrists is surprising. Its strong will,
already formed character, adult eyes, and amazing strength
and sill are ironic in the face of its helplessness. These
108
factors transcend cuteness. They fuse all of time into one
moment, because they allude to the infant as it will be as
adult. Its overgrown brain, its delicate wrists include the
child's potential in its actual. The infant is willing to
attempt feats that would be impossible for an adult, and is
infinitely creative in its actions. Its fontanel hints at
the tension between life and death. The infant reminds us of
the infinite possibilities of existence.
The qualities Morreall lists as cute are those qualities
that endear babies in general to adults in general, and thus
his argument seems to make sense that these qualities would
be important to survival. These are the qualities that would
enable any adult to feel compassion for any baby, not only
his own, and care for it. However, as Morreall himself
points out, "a starving child is not
cute,"6
and newborns,
especially premature ones, do not have the plump cheeks,
arms, and legs of older infants. Perhaps, then, it is
helplessness that really renders babies appealing, or what
7 .
Morreall terms their "non-threatenmgness" . Certainly, as
Morreall points out, it is possible not to have sympathy for
someone who is dependent. Vulnerability seems to conflict
with cuteness. It may the very ugliness of the vulnerable
that evokes sympathy. A dirty, smelly animal and a scrawny
newborn are ugly. They cry out for their rightful cuteness
to be restored. Because they are vulnerable, they deserve to
be cute. I think we translate cute as loved: If a baby is
clean, fat, and healthy, he is cared for; he is cute. He is
no longer vulnerable, because people greedily want to be near
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that baby for their own sensuous gratification. The
destitute, the ugly, the unloved baby is the one that appeals
to its parents alone. After all, we know of children who
need to be adopted, and, although we may be tempted to offer
assistance, we feel no real obligation. We are obliged,
however, to transform our own baby from vulnerable to safe
and adventurous .
The newborn appeals to its parents not only in its
vulnerability and ugliness. An infant possesses a specific
beauty, and that is why parents prefer their child, even if
it is ugly or deformed, and often find the same qualities
cute that strangers might find hideous .
When it is first born, an infant often looks old. Its
skin is wrinkly, its face is thin, it often bears a
resemblance to an adult in the family, and it looks wise.
Again, it foreshadows the future. It represents pure
actuality in that it enters the world entirely itself, but it
also represents pure potentiality because it is nothing yet.
As the baby fills out, it loses the resemblance to adults and
looks more like a baby. It becomes cute. The newborn, as
old person, is also threatening. In fact, threatening is an
attribute of children in general. They are threatening on
three levels: universally, humanly, and specifically.
Universally, babies and children confront one with all
manner of metaphysical questions. Their dependence on an
adult for answers seems more like a test than an innocent
wish to know. It is almost as if the child is the
philosopher leading the adult onward in a dialectic. At
least it is necessary always to question previously accepted
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beliefs in the face of the child's trust. If it's an awesome
responsibility caring for his body, it's a grave one caring
for his mind.
Humanly, babies mean mortality. The adult is preparing
the next generation for taking over the world. He is
preparing to die. We see this, too, in the way time speeds
by after we have children. I think we have a bond with other
parents, and all other values are dimmed in the face of the
feeling of shared humanity that we have for every other
parent .
Specifically, children threaten us with their own
eventual adulthood. Morreall mentions the desire of the
adult to be close to babies. Mixed with that is the
awareness that they will not always be babies, and that this
is perhaps the most gratified the adult will ever be. Of
course, the fleeting quality of this pleasure makes it even
sweeter .
The physical gratification that one gains from children
recalls the disinterested pleasure of Kant's aesthetic
theory. The qualification I would add to the disinterested
appreciation of art is the same as the one I would add to the
appreciation of babies. As Morreall points out, appreciation
of babies is altruistic, but also selfish. I would point out
that this is a pure greed. Like art, a baby heightens our
awareness of our better self, that is, our specific self, as
well as our appreciation of the baby's self. We bask in the
presence of a concrete self, whose selfness makes us feel
safe, and we want to return the favor. We know that babies,
like art, are good for us, and we hunger for the edification
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they offer. The nibbling that Morreall discusses, but does
not explain, reflects the desire to break the tension of
intense love and to parody it, perhaps with a hint of trying
to be part of the pure selfness of the infant. We think of
Adorno' s primal desire to devour art. When a stranger
attempts this nibbling, it is often a sign of hostility, even
jealousy, as if he were trying to reap the benefits of
something he is not a part of.
Humorous allusions to love and hate are a common way of
expressing love, and lightening the tone of what is otherwise
a very serious undertaking. Humor, in fact, is the only way
to accept the responsibility of child rearing. Childbirth
itself, after all, is ridiculously painful, an absurdly
serious, life changing event, and a riotously common
occurrence. Each child is a work of the utmost
craftsmanship, and yet children are oddly common. What feels
like a life' s achievement is tossed off hourly by fourteen-
year-old girls . As for the family, who can help but laugh at
anyone stupid enough to put all their eggs in one basket?
Art offers the same thing that children offer, "emotions
that are complex and even mixed with opposite emotions,
emotions linked to a greater understanding of life, and
emotions that within my experience of the artwork develop and
deepen and perhaps even get
resolved."8 Thus, when Morreall
decides that "if hungry babies had needed aesthetes as
parents in order to be fed, our race would never have gotten
started,"9 he makes what is, as we have seen, a very common
mistake. He decides that appreciation of beauty in any
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complexity must be learned, although of course it is never
explained who is to teach this appreciation, and where the
teacher himself is to learn it. It makes more sense to admit
that people are perfectly capable of complex emotions and
appreciation of art, and acknowledge that the only way to
"learn"
appreciation is to be allowed free judgment.
Universal free education, in all subjects, is necessary in
order that selves might appreciate other selves and
themselves, and thus ensure truly free judgment. Doubt is
the mark of the independence of each soul .
Ted Cohen points out that training in aesthetic judgment
is "the development of taste, or the directed training of
one's normal faculties."10 He expands on Kant's idea of
taste: "The exercise of taste involves no concept at all.
Taste involves noticing. It is not merely a manipulation of
oneself. But it is a kind of noticing evinced in a feeling.
One might say that Kant thinks it is a special feeling, but
for the fact that he claims it is so un-special that one can
1 1
demand to find it in all other people." As we have seen,
Kant also demands to find moral judgment in all other people .
Kant, instead of hesitating to judge lest he be judged,
requires of others, as well as himself, actions that are
executed in order to stand up to judgment . Trust your
judgment, he says, and act according to it, so that others
may act according to theirs. We can extend this to insist
that people trust their taste, because judgment depends on
the specificity of each
person' s ability to appreciate
beauty.
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Step Sixteen: My own work reflects, I hope, my views on
experience .
"The importance of physical detail is that it creates for us
a kind of dream, a rich and vivid play in the mind." (John
Gardner)
Unlike Becker's idea of controlling our choices in order
that we won't miss too much through bad planning, my
paintings show my belief in the haphazard quality of life,
which I see as fate or destiny. I believe that it is most
important that things unfold the way they must. I don't
believe in God, but I believe that there are Lessons to be
Learned. I am extremely thankful for what I have been given,
and how it has been given, and I believe that is to be seen
in my work. My paintings are workings of art because they
aspire to be whole. Whether they are actually art in the
sense of being aesthetically whole remains to be seen (by the
non-eye that sees whatever we are about to see) . The series
I present as my thesis is an attempt to study the layered
meanings of life, and depict the overall aesthetic quality
that my life has gained since the introduction of our
children, Robby and Greta, into it. Perhaps like a tapestry,
my life has a richness of tone that someone should know
about. Knowing them has taught me faith in the self, and in
humanity as a whole. I have also realized the pressing need
for social reform. I have learned that there is immense
satisfaction in the specific, but that the whole is
important. They have shown me the value of the work, the
labor, of art, and the importance of fashioning a specific,
meaningful backdrop for thought. I wish that I could make
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one person feel what I have felt. And in that sense art is
political it fosters discussion, and calls out to the
autonomical individual to make himself heard.
Art has an absolute identity beyond its ob jectness . One
can classify objects according to categories, but in judging
the absolute quality, humans can only use instinct and the
artist can't judge his own work absolutely. Ideas pop into
my head from some source and I execute them. After the idea
pops into my head I find it appealing, ugly, funny. My work
is not done in an attempt to be any of these, but rather in
response to the idea. Often the original idea changes during
its execution. Then, again, I respond to the finished piece
and find qualities in it, even as an outside audience does.
I do not feel solely responsible for, the work, although I am
proud to have participated in its becoming. That is why I
have no difficulty criticizing or praising my own work. It
is as if I am the medium, or vehicle, and the would-be work
of art is channeled through me. Consequently, it is not
particularly helpful to ask me about my work. I know as much
about it as you do. When the painting is finished, my work
is done, and I pass it on to you, or to me, for inspection by
an objective viewer.
I have tried to illustrate in these pages what I see as
the ideal of all action, including artwork, and that is the
idea of the aesthetic whole. The aesthetic whole is an ideal
to which all actions aspire, but it is a changing, moving,
paradoxical ideal. It is paradoxical because it is attained
even as it is being sought, and yet it is unattainable. It
is not an end, but a means, and yet it is the ultimate end.
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It is the highest ideal, and yet it is integrated in the
mundane. I have discussed Plato, Kant, and Dewey because
they present a hierarchy of values crucial to the discussion
of an ideal of behavior. They also have faith in the
lowliest person to understand this ideal and act according to
it. Yet, they undermine their own systems by deciding that
good judgment must be taught.
I have discussed feminists and Becker because their
faith in the value of the individual and point of view
dominates their theories. I share their contempt for
contrived hierarchies, but their abandonment of an absolute
reality to which we aspire leaves me cold. I have tried to
show that there is a way of integrating values without
arriving at a valueless therapeutic system, in which all
opinions are equally "valid". I have tried to criticize a
system based on fear, in which children are graded on the way
they think in order to stamp cultural values onto them. I
stress the importance of judgment, discussion, even heated
argument. I believe there are good and bad, but I question
the faithlessness in the power of good and bad when petty
humans attempt to nail down their definitions for all time.
Values are elusive and require constant re-evaluation.
If cultural values are indeed valuable, then a child
will embrace them willingly. As an adult, I shudder every
time my work is graded, even if it's given a high grade. I
am insulted that someone would attempt to stamp a mark of
approval on my work rather than discussing its meaning. I
find it as fearful to label someone as having bad taste as to
censor works of art. It is simply not necessary to make that
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distinction. If people assume they have an internal
wholeness, which they arrive in the world with and ever after
must attempt to regain, then they will have a responsibility
to that wholeness. If people are required to judge, and to
evaluate themselves, they will educate themselves. The lack
of faith by society in its members' ability to judge, without
conventions stamped onto them, is mirrored in the lack of
faith by an artist in his work to be what it is without a
style or theory stamped onto it.
My work, then, is an attempt to explore an aesthetic
wholeness, just as all my actions represent that attempt.
Guilt is awareness that I have undermined my own attempt in
some way. The stamping of the baby's face on the surface of
the paintings reflects, to me, that faith in the rhythm of
life that has been stamped onto me by my children in a way
that no amount of grading will stamp culture onto me.
Fittingly enough, I looked up the word
"diaper" in the
dictionary to see if it had a recognizable root, after my
thesis show is hanging, after most of this has been written.
Words have a way of reflecting how experience is integrated.
We say something is "not nice", for example. We mean this
morally, but it is also an aesthetic pronouncement, because
"nice"
also means fancy or pretty. A diaper is "a fabric
with a distinctive pattern, an allover pattern consisting of
one or more small repeated units of design (as geometric
figures) connecting with one another or growing out of one
another with continuously flowing or straight
lines."2 All
year I haven't just been changing diapers, I've been painting
them!
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